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THE LAST WAVE: THE RISE OF THE
CONTINGENT SCHOOL DISTRICT
AARON JAY SAIGER"
Spurred in part by state court cases holding that states bear a
constitutional duty to educate all children adequately, and making
creative use of the arguments of school choice advocates, the states
and other policy actors have in recent years recast the problem of
deficient schooling as one of government structure rather than one
of individual rights. This reorientation has contributed to a
dramatic erosion of the traditional role of the local school district as
the leading administrative, policymaking, and legal unit of
American school government. A new, polyarchic distribution of
power has arisen in place of district primacy, bearing potentially
momentous consequences for education litigation and for the
realization of education rights generally. Interests that currently
wield disproportionate power over urban school district
management, especially teachers' unions, will likely find their
influence reduced. Structural change will also likely blunt the
ability of courts to guide further the course of school reform.
Finally, the shift toward polyarchy may well begin to erode the
power of suburban interests that have long dominated education
law and politics.
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INTRODUCTION
Nearly every account of the thirty-year-old effort to litigate
conditions in distressed public schools adopts a construct, coined by
William Thro in 1990, that categorizes the cases into three, roughly
chronological "waves."' The first and second waves consisted of
claims that poorly funded, poorly performing school districts violate
the equal protection guarantees of the national and state
constitutions, respectively. Third-wave plaintiffs alleged that the
same conditions violate a right to an adequate public education that
children enjoy under state constitutions apart from equal protection.2
Thro clearly introduced the term "wave" to convey the idea of
successive theories, each rising to prominence as its predecessor
faltered. Thus, the first wave ended with San Antonio v. Rodriguez,3
which held even substantial differences in school quality to be
consistent with federal equal protection.' Similarly, the third-wave
1. William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky, and
Texas Decisions on the Future of Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. &
EDUC. 219, 222-32 (1990). Among the numerous and diverse adopters of Thro's construct
are MATTHEW H. BOSWORTH, COURTS AS CATALYSTS: STATE SUPREME COURTS AND
PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE EQUITY 28-41 (2001); Michael Heise, State Constitutions,
School Finance Litigation, and the "Third Wave": From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L.
REV. 1151, 1152 (1995); Michael A. Rebell, Fiscal Equity Litigation and the Democratic
Imperative, EQUITY & EXCELLENCE EDUC., Dec. 1999, at 5, 7-8.
2. See Thro, supra note 1, at 239-41.
3. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
4. Id. at 54-55.
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adequacy theory was crafted after second-wave state equal protection
arguments sustained several prominent defeats.5
The ubiquitous wave paradigm has provided scholars with a
metaphor both picturesque and compelling. As I have written
previously, even spectacular waves soon recede, altering the contours
of the beach barely if at all-a nice parallel to state school-finance
litigation, where splashy legal victories have been followed by little
change on the ground and, sometimes, by judicial backpedalling.6
The image of breakers crashing and then retreating also evokes the
evanescence and froth that. Frederick Hess and others bemoan as
educational " 'policy churn'-an endless stream of new initiatives,
with the schools and teachers never having time to become
comfortable with any given change."7 The three-wave construct is
further notable for the irresistible invitation that it extends to
academics and law students to imagine a fourth wave.8 The metaphor
even stretches nicely when it is noticed that the transition between
the second and third waves was really no succession at all: equity and
adequacy have proven to be related concepts, and many prominent
contemporary cases rely upon state constitutional guarantees both of
5. See Heise, supra note 1, at 1174-76.
6. See Aaron Saiger, Note, Disestablishing Local School Districts as a Remedy for
Educational Inadequacy, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1830, 1833 (1999).
7. FREDERICK M. HESS, SPINNING WHEELS: THE POLITICS OF URBAN SCHOOL
REFORM 52 (1999); see also, e.g., Melissa Marschall & Paru Shah, Keeping Policy Churn
Off the Agenda: Urban Education and Civic Capacity, 33 POL'Y STUD. J. 161, 162, 165
(2005) (criticizing policy churn).
8. See, e.g., Maurice R. Dyson, Leave No Child Behind: Normative Proposals to
Link Educational Adequacy Claims and High Stakes Assessment Due Process Challenges,
7 TEx. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 1, 18-19 (2002) ("Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964...
promised to become the source of what I would identify as nothing less than a 'fourth
wave' of school finance litigation."); Michael A. Rebell, Adequacy Litigations: A New
Path to Equity?, in BRINGING EQUITY BACK 291, 292 (Janice Petrovich & Amy Stuart
Wells eds., 2005) (" '[A]dequacy' litigations are a harbinger of a new wave of reform
initiatives that may merge equity and excellence."); James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and
Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 307-10 (1999) (proposing a fourth wave of school-finance
litigation in which plaintiffs demand "socioeconomic or racial integration" and/or school
choice); Julie K. Underwood, School Finance Adequacy as Vertical Equity, 28 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 493, 519 (1995) (noting that equity based on student outcomes is a potential
criterion for a "fourth wave of school finance reform litigation"); Sarah S. Erving, Note,
New York's Education Finance Litigation and the Title VI Wave: An Analysis of
Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 10 J.L. & POL'Y 271, 312 (2001) (arguing that
statutory claims based upon Title VI will create "solid precedent upon which the fourth
wave can be built"); Kevin Randall McMillan, Note, The Turning Tide: The Emerging
Fourth Wave of School Finance Reform Litigation and the Courts' Lingering Institutional
Concerns, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1867, 1896-1902 (1998) (suggesting that Sheff v. O'Neill, 678
A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996), is a harbinger of a fourth wave).
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equal protection and of educational adequacy.9 The role of state
equal protection arguments in such cases can be thought of as an
undertow, the receding remnants of the second wave mixing with the
onrushing third.1"
Notwithstanding all its virtues, however, the wave metaphor has
outlived its usefulness and should be laid to rest. The future, and
perhaps the repair, of substandard public schools no longer depend
upon specifying the substantive features of the constitutional right to
education. This is because policy actors-states, the federal
government, and other groups-have recast the constitutional
problem of deficient schooling as one of government structure rather
than of individual rights. In particular, they have undertaken to
weaken, and even undermine, the school district, which for decades
enjoyed unassailable status as the leading institution of school
governance and as a monopoly provider of public education. Many
district powers have been redistributed to a range of other public and
private institutions. Those powers that remain, moreover, have been
made contingent. Several reforms usually analyzed separately-
including state accountability regimes, the Federal No Child Left
Behind Act,11 school choice, and mayoral control of schools-have
collectively forced school districts to exercise those powers they
retain in ways that further the policy agendas of external actors rather
than in accordance with their own preferences.
This is a new structural paradigm for education governance, and
it alters not only the way that schools are governed but the constraints
that will shape further education reform in the future. After arguing
in Part I that the shift is genuine, dramatic, and momentous, I ask two
questions: How can this structural change be accounted for? And
what are its likely implications? In Part II, I argue that in some
important part the recasting of the role of the school district was
spurred by school-finance litigation, and particularly by the third-
wave cases. The school-finance cases have not, as some
commentators have argued, simply been "disentrenching,"
openendedly forcing states to abandon policies of inaction and to take
9. See James E. Ryan & Thomas Saunders, Foreword to Symposium on School
Finance Litigation: Emerging Trends or New Dead Ends?, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 463,
465-68 (2004) (noting this phenomenon in the context of the "wave metaphor and its
limits"); infra notes 204-08 and accompanying text.
10. See Aaron J. Saiger, Legislating Accountability: Standards, Sanctions, and School
District Reform, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1655, 1710 (2005).
11. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001,20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6578 (Supp. 112002).
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responsibility for education. 2 The announced doctrine of the third
wave pushed state governments to identify any constitutional
deficiencies in their schools with the structural primacy of school
districts, and to reduce that primacy accordingly. I argue further that
states were helped in making this identification by the
contemporaneous rise of school choice advocacy, which gave
currency and support to the idea that the failings of public schools are
rooted in their mode of governance.
Part III assesses the implications of structural reform for the
realization of education rights. I focus on three institutions
threatened by the transition from school district primacy to
educational polyarchy: the local leadership of urban school districts,
the state courts, and suburbanites. Interests that wield
disproportionate power over urban school district management,
especially teachers' unions, will naturally find that attacks on the
district as an institution reduce their influence. Less
straightforwardly, structural change reduces the ability of courts to
further influence the course of school reform. When power was
concentrated in school districts, at least there was a locus for a
remedial order. In a polyarchic distribution of power among districts,
mayors, state departments of education, federal bureaucrats, charter
schools, and parents choosing schools in markets, even the address for
school reform is unclear, and the nature of potential remedies even
less so. Finally, I argue that the ascension of polyarchy has begun
slowly to erode the power of suburban interests that have long
dominated education politics.
State courts' endorsement of the third-wave claim that children
are guaranteed an adequate public education has not led to
substantial amelioration of the gross inadequacies that many
American students face. But its result has been nonetheless
momentous: it has catalyzed a new set of governmental arrangements
for schools that have supplanted school districts' place as the single,
pivotal focus of any hope for fixing schools' problems. In this new
structure, with its new distribution of power, lies the future of school
reform. The third wave is the last not because school reform is no
longer urgent but because it no longer depends on further
12. James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely
Imagined: The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 183, 191-92 (2003) ("[Tjhe courts seem to have stumbled upon a way
to realize their virtues as disentrenching institutions, exposing encrusted inequalities
through public and constitutional scrutiny, without, however, directly administering the
positive reforms that they have proved unable to command successfully.").
2006]
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refinements of judicial understandings of precisely what the right to
education guarantees. Instead the problem becomes how to effect
educational improvement in a new environment of district
contingency and wide distribution of authority and influence.
I. A PAROXYSM IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE OF SCHOOLING
Public primary and secondary schools cost approximately $390
billion in 2001, "more than defense and not too much less than Social
Security. '13 As the comparison to defense and Social Security brings
to mind, government undertakings of. such magnitude perforce
generate enormous bureaucracies; and with substantial bureaucracy
invariably comes the basic question of how to organize all that
government.
In the case of schools, this question had been settled in American
public education for many decades. The primary administrative,
bureaucratic, policymaking, and legal unit was the local school
district. Backstopping district activities were the states, which
provided funding, coordinated district activities, and made policy in
defined areas like textbook selection, but which otherwise were
districts' junior partners. In addition, beginning in the mid-1960s, the
federal government began to target special funding at the education
of poor and disabled children, and, through its courts and later its
Department of Justice, fitfully to enforce a policy against school
segregation. Otherwise Washington left school districts more or less
alone. 14
No longer. This district-centered organizational paradigm is
imploding. Although the nation's roughly 15,000 school districts
continue to play a vital role in education governance, their autonomy
and their primacy have both been sharply eroded. New legislation
has arrogated numerous powers that were once assigned to districts to
agencies at the state, federal, and school levels, constraining district
flexibility and ratcheting up their accountability. Other legislation
has required districts to compete for students and funds with ever-
increasing numbers of charter schools and sometimes with private
schools as well. Even the corporate identity of districts has been
rendered tenuous. Districts deemed inadequate are now subject to
consolidation with their neighbors or, more commonly, to
disestablishment, whereby their local leadership is discharged and
13. JENNIFER HOCHSCHILD & NATHAN SCOVRONICK, THE AMERICAN DREAM
AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLs 20 (2003).
14. See infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
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their duties assumed by the states or their designates. 5 In several
troubled urban districts, state legislatures have replaced the state-
district structure wholesale, shifting responsibility for school
operations and management to the urban mayoralty.
16
In short, the school district is no longer what it was. Once stable,
central, and in control, today it finds its powers eroding, its monopoly
terminated, and its very jurisdiction contingent. In view of both the
magnitude of the public education enterprise in dollars and its
importance to the replication of civil society, the shift is particularly
striking. As the balance of this Part demonstrates, it is no
exaggeration to describe the changes in school governance over the
past few decades, taken together, as portending a shift of
"constitutional moment."'7
A. The Layer-Cake Model
American education begins with localities. Local control of
schools is a nationwide and longstanding American practice. 8 In the
colonial period education was profoundly local, growing from the
ground up into a system of neighborhood schools and coalescing only
slowly into what contemporary observers would recognize as public
school districts. 9 Although early state constitutions asserted state
15. See infra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 135-41 and accompanying text.
17. Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE
L.J. 1013, 1055 (1984). Like the New Deal, the contemporary education realignment
involves "a sustained period of extraordinary institutional conflict" that may, in the end,
"contribute to the legitimacy accorded to the final constitutional resolution." Id. at 1053
(citing CHARLES BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 56-67 (1960)).
18. Hawaii is often cited as an exception to this "universal" pattern, since, unlike any
other state, it has a single statewide school district that operates and finances all schools.
E.g., David K. Cohen & James P. Spillane, Policy and Practice: The Relations Between
Governance and Instruction, in DESIGNING COHERENT EDUCATION POLICY:
IMPROVING THE SYSTEM 35, 38-39 (Susan H. Fuhrman ed., 1993). However, Hawaii's
decision to adopt a single-district system is administrative. The Hawaii Code authorizes
the state education department to create school districts at its discretion. HAW. REV.
STAT. § 302A-1142 (Supp. 2004). Hawaii does decentralize some administrative
responsibility, not including school finance, to local subdivisions of its one district. See
EDGAR L. MORPHET ET AL., EDUCATICN ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION:
CONCEPTS, PRACTICES, AND ISSUES 237 n.1 (4th ed. 1982). The current Governor of
Hawaii, Linda Lingle, "has tried unsuccessfully throughout her term to break up Hawaii's
single, 181,000-student school system into smaller districts with locally elected boards."
Linda Jacobson, Hawaii Moves Forward with New School Finance Formula, EDUC. WK.,
Nov. 30, 2005, at 24.
19. See CARL F. KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC: COMMON SCHOOLS AND
AMERICAN SOCIETY, 1780-1860, at 13 (1983); Michael Kirst, A History of American
School Governance, in WHO'S IN CHARGE HERE? THE TANGLED WEB OF SCHOOL
GOVERNANCE AND POLICY 14,18 (Noel Epstein ed., 2004).
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power over education and a state duty to provide it,2" that nominal
assignment of power assumed that education would continue to be
organized and administered by preexisting local school districts.21
This assumption was borne out.22 In later entrants to the union, local
districts quickly displaced more centralized structures as the
governmental institution of choice.23 Through much of American
history-until quite recently-the primacy of local school districts was
not only sustained but strengthened.24
Contemporary state education codes continue to reflect a broad
delegation of power to districts. The Texas Code is fairly typical,
stating that "[tihe school districts ... created in accordance with the
laws of this state have the primary responsibility for implementing the
state's system of public education"25  States' sweeping grants of
authority to districts generally include power to tax (a power
primarily exercised through the property tax); to budget and to spend;
to hire and to fire, powers especially important vis-A-vis the
appointment of the district superintendent and the conduct of
collective bargaining with teachers; to set curricula; and to establish
general policies for the conduct of all aspects of the educational
program.26 Arkansas, to take another typical state, catalogues the
duties of a local school board at length: to keep school grounds in
good repair; to hire and fire; to prescribe curricula; to establish
budgets; to receive, disburse, and manage funds; and to incur debt.27
Nor should enumerations of particular school district powers
obscure the general. A contemporary handbook for school district
personnel summarizes the duties of the school board as creating a
"sufficient number of policies to provide a map for directing activity
in the school or district."28 Legislative catch-all provisions grant to
20. See ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE, VISIONS OF SCHOOLING: CONSCIENCE,
COMMUNITY, AND COMMON EDUCATION 13-14 (2000).
21. See MORPHET ET AL., supra note 18, at 238.
22. See KAESTLE, supra note 19, at 22 ("The notion of a state system of education-
that is, of a central authority with coercive power to establish, finance, and regulate
schools-did not gain much ground in the early national period.").
23. See id. at 112.
24. See MORPHET ET AL., supra note 18, at 238-39. Indeed, in many communities the
traditional school district is properly described as "the central public institution in the
local community." GARY ORFIELD, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN EDUCATION
2 (1969).
25. TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 11.002 (Vernon 1996).
26. MORPHET ET AL., supra note 18, at 248-49.
27. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-13-620 (Supp. 2005).
28. PATRICIA C. CONRAN, SCHOOL SUPERINTENDENT'S COMPLETE HANDBOOK 3
(1989).
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the school board and the superintendent it selects the power to lead
the district, exercising control over the district's policy agenda and
priorities. Thus Arkansas's extensive list of delegated powers is
supplemented by several general provisions: the board is to "[v]isit
classrooms frequently, but no less than annually, in the schools in
their district while the children are present, see to the welfare of the
pupils, encourage them in their studies, and assist the teachers in the
work so far as they can" and to "[d]o all other things necessary and
lawful for the conduct of efficient free public schools in the district.
29
Similar provisions to Arkansas's are in place in other states.30 These
general powers are overtly "political": districts make decisions on
allocating goods and services in ways that necessitate choices among
individuals, groups, and values.31 This is consistent with the dominant
practice of determining school board membership by local election.
The characterization of states as junior partners to local districts
can appear inconsistent with the source of districts' capacious district
powers, namely the state codes. What powers the state gives, one
might think, it may take away. This is a straightforward application of
the foundational principle of local government law that local
governments lack sovereign power; rather they are mere "creature[s]
of the state," permitted to exercise only such authority as the state
specifically delegates to them, and subject to establishment,
restriction, and abolition at state discretion.32 School districts are
29. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-13-620.
30. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-341 (Supp. 2005) (designating various board
responsibilities, including managing and controlling school property, disciplining students,
and prescribing curricula and criteria for the promotion and graduation of pupils, and also
authorizing the board to "[p]rescribe and enforce policies and procedures for the
governance of the schools, not inconsistent with law or rules prescribed by the state board
of education"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1001.43 (West 2004) (categorizing board's duties into
twelve categories such as fiscal management, student management, facilities management,
and personnel); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 1709 (McKinney Supp. 2005) (outlining the board's
duties down to the amount of milk that must be provided for students, followed by a
catch-all provision: "To have in all respects the superintendence, management and control
of the education affairs of the district, and, therefore, [to] have all the powers reasonably
necessary to exercise powers granted expressly or by implication and to discharge duties
imposed expressly or by implication by this chapter or other statutes").
31. See LAURENCE IANNACONNE & FRANK W. LUTZ, POLITICS, POWER AND
POLICY: THE GOVERNING OF LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICTS 12 (1970).
32. Richard Briffault, The Local School District in American Law, in BESIEGED:
SCHOOL BOARDS AND THE FUTURE OF EDUCATION POLITICS 24,28 (William Howe ed.,
2005) ("As a local government, a school district is a creature of the state."); see also JOHN
F. DILLON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 55, at 173 (1872)
(setting out "Dillon's Rule" that local governments enjoy only those powers either
expressly granted by the states, "those necessarily or fairly implied in, or incident to, the
powers expressly granted," and "those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the
2006]
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quintessential local governments of this kind-more so than general
local governments, for which home rule33 and other constitutional or
legislative provisions34 can provide a certain independence.35 The
independence of school districts has no parallel constitutional
foundation.36 Nor is it implied by state education codes, which
explicitly assert states' ability to delineate the borders and powers of
school districts.37
Much more important than the latent power of the state to
refrain from delegating power or to withdraw power from districts,
however, is states' policy of delegation in fact.38 In 1978 Professor
Frederick Wirt wrote that although "state government ... exercises
complete legal authority over all local governments, including
schools, ... for ideological reasons, the state has done little with its
formal power."3 9  Indeed, states rely so heavily upon districts for
corporation-not simply convenient, but indispensable"); HAROLD M. HYMAN, A MORE
PERFECT UNION 232 (1975) (noting that Dillon's treatise is still in general use fifty years
after its publication); DALE KRANE ET AL., HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE
HANDBOOK 13 (2001) (noting contemporary vitality of Dillon's Rule).
33. See KRANE ET AL., supra note 32, at 476-77 tbl.A1.
34. See id. at 15-16. See generally DAVID R. BERMAN, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND
THE STATES 70-76 (2003) (arguing that home rule provisions seek to "create an imperium
in imperio for municipalities by making them a state within a state and to construct a strict
division between state and local powers comparable to the notion of dual federalism," but
that nevertheless home rule doctrine is applied to raise "few practical barriers to state
intervention into what one might consider local affairs").
35. See Briffault, supra note 32, at 31-32 (arguing that in contrast to general local
governments, which sometimes enjoy home rule authority, Dillon's Rule is strictly applied
to school districts).
36. See id. at 41; Richard Briffault, The Role of Local Control in School Finance
Reform, 24 CONN. L. REV. 733, 779-80 (1992). A few state constitutions mention school
districts, which may suggest that districts must exist in some form. E.g., ME. CONST. art.
VIII, pt.1, § 1 ("The Legislature are authorized, and it shall be their duty to require, the
several towns to make suitable provision, at their own expense, for the support and
maintenance of public schools .. "); OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (referring to "each school
district embraced wholly or in part within any city").
37. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 2601, 3550 (West Supp. 2005) (setting out
limitations on the ability of county officials to alter school district boundaries or recognize
districts); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-241 (West 2002 & Supp. 2005) (listing the "[p]owers of
school districts"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1001.42 (West 2004 & Supp. 2005) (listing powers
and duties of "district school board[s]"); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 1525 (McKinney 2000)
(reserving final authority to alter school district boundaries to the state commissioner of
education); accord, e.g., Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1273 (Conn. 1996) ("[D]irectly or
indirectly, the state has always controlled public elementary and secondary education.").
38. See Briffault, supra note 36, at 781-85 ("[L]ocal control is state policy.").
39. Frederick M. Wirt, What State Laws Say About Local Control, PHI DELTA
KAPPAN, Apr. 1978, at 517, 517. In hindsight, scholars can trace the beginnings of the
erosion of district power to the middle of the last century, although that erosion has
accelerated only recently. See, e.g., DOUGLAS M. ABRAMS, CONFLICT, COMPETITION, OR
COOPERATION? DILEMMAS OF STATE EDUCATION POLICYMAKING 18 (1993) (noting
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service provision, policymaking, and the raising of funds that it is hard
to imagine how states could abandon their policy of delegation. To
delocalize education would mean to create a very large state
bureaucracy to perform multitudinous functions with which states are
unfamiliar and for which they are ill-suited. It would demand that
states reconceptualize their tax system, and dramatically raise state
tax rates.40 It would also invite direct conflict with those interest
groups whom educational localism strongly favors. Professor James
Ryan and others have argued extensively and persuasively that the
primary beneficiaries of educational localism are relatively
prosperous suburbanites. 41  For those wealthy enough to choose
among suburban residences, educational localism provides a method
for realizing the Tieboutian benefits of segregation by wealth and
taste for education;42 the concomitant ability to wall themselves off
that as early as the 1960s, "state education agencies and their administrators [began]
playing a more visible and influential role in their interactions with local school districts,"
although "[t]he local superintendent and school board remained the senior partner");
David Tyack, Forgotten Players: How Local School Districts Shaped American Education,
in SCHOOL DISTRICTS AND INSTRUCTIONAL RENEWAL 9, 10 (Amy M. Hightower et al.
eds., 2002) ("Since the 1950s, local school districts and their boards have faced continuing
erosion of their powers.").
40. See John Yinger, State Aid and the Pursuit of Educational Equity: An Overview, in
HELPING CHILDREN LEFT BEHIND: STATE AID AND THE PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL
EQUITY 22-25 (John Yinger ed., 2004). A few states, under pressure from their courts,
delocalized school taxes even as they retained other aspects of localism. Michigan
repealed its existing local property tax in 1993, and in 1994 voters approved a
constitutional amendment replacing it with a sales tax system. See Michael F. Addonizio
et al., Blowing Up the System: Some Fiscal and Legal Perspectives on Michigan's School
Finance Reform, 107 EDUC. L. REP. 15, 16-18 (1996). In the majority of Michigan districts
the result was that the state, not the district, set per-pupil spending; some districts were
allowed to supplement funds subject to state caps. See Paul N. Courant & Susanna Loeb,
Centralization of School Finance in Michigan, 16 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 114, 114-
19 (1997). Kansas and Wyoming have also effectively eliminated their local property tax
systems. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-6431 (LEXIS through 2005 legislation); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 21-13 (2003); see also Laurie Reynolds, Skybox Schools: Public Education as
Private Luxury, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 755, 809 (2004) (analyzing these provisions).
Washington has established a statewide retail sales tax augmented by property taxes and
other state revenues to generate approximately seventy-five percent of school district fund
revenue. See id.; Sch. Apportionment & Fin. Servs., Office of Superintendent of Pub.
Instruction, Washington School Finance Primer 3 (Sept. 1999), available at http://www.k12.
wa.us/safs/PUB/PRI/primer99.pdf.
41. See James E. Ryan, Brown, School Choice, and the Suburban Veto, 90 VA. L. REV.
1635, 1646 (2004); accord, e.g., Maurice R. Dyson, Playing Games with Equality: A Game
Theoretic Critique of Educational Sanctions, Remedies, and Strategic Noncompliance, 77
TEMP. L. REV. 577, 579-81 (2004); Peter D. Enrich, Race and Money, Courts and Schools:
Tentative Lessons from Connecticut, 36 IND. L. REV. 523, 532-50 (2003); Reynolds, supra
note 40, at 809.
42. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON.
416,418 (1956).
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from responsibility, both fiscal and political, for less fortunate school
systems;43 and a way to capitalize their tax investments in public
school into privately held home values.44 Urban school districts also
generate strong constituencies for localism; although local control of
these generally larger, poorer, and more heterogeneous districts does
not offer urban residents the same deal available to citizens in small,
tight, rich, suburban districts, localism in the urban setting does
provide political power and control over remunerative jobs and
budgetary resources to groups otherwise without much of either.45 In
light of all these considerations, the state power to abandon
educational localism is not just latent but nominal: states could do it
in theory, but not in practice.'
Federal interest in schools was, until recently, limited to
particular questions of education policy rather than schools' general
management. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly and
controversially decided the scope of in-school expressive and religious
freedom, but these issues are at the periphery of school districts' and
states' academic and pedagogical responsibilities; indeed, "the more a
particular policy has to do with academic function of schools, the
more likely it is that the Court will uphold the policy, even if it means
truncating a constitutional right. '47  Numerous early proposals for
federal aid to schools failed,' and those that passed carefully avoided
43. See DOUGLAS REED, ON EQUAL TERMS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 128 (2001).
44. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: How HOME
VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE AND LAND-
USE POLICIES 39-97 (2001).
45. See Saiger, supra note 10, at 1665-70.
46. See id. at 1662-64.
47. James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1340
(2000). Ryan argues that the Court has been willing to intervene when access to schools is
at issue but hesitant to interfere in matters involving the educational process within
schools, because regulatory decisions concerning access "do not themselves involve
academic considerations, but rather social considerations of who deserves to receive public
education." Id. at 1420-22. Salomone approaches these cases somewhat differently,
concluding that speech and access cases do indeed have major academic and pedagogical
implications; she calls the United States Supreme Court a "schoolmaster" and argues that
it "has established standards that profoundly affect the structure and substance of
schooling"-even as it "has failed to develop a coherent and stable theory of schooling."
SALOMONE, supra note 20, at 75-76. Erwin Chemerinsky reads recent Supreme Court
cases to support an across-the-board policy of deference to the discretion of local school
administrators that varies relatively little with the policy arena. Erwin Chemerinsky, The
Deconstitutionalization of Education, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 111, 112, 124-27 (2004).
48. See KEVIN R. KOSAR, FAILING GRADES: THE FEDERAL POLITICS OF
EDUCATION STANDARDS 79-81 (2005).
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intruding upon local prerogatives.49 Deference to localism persisted
even as federal funding was targeted to disabled and poor students."
Indeed, in one respect, Federal Title I aid actually increases district
power. Because states must distribute funds to districts according to
complex federal algorithms, rather than at their own discretion, the
program gives districts access to two separate, independent flows of
intergovernmental transfer payments, one from the state and one
from Washington.5'
Much more intrusive has been federal administrative and judicial
regulation in the areas of disability5 2 and desegregation.53 With
special education costs now exceeding twenty percent of some
districts' total expenditures,54 and with districts spending years under
49. See ORFIELD, supra note 24, at 8, 14.
50. See TASK FORCE ON No CHILD LEFT BEHIND, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, FINAL REPORT 5 (2005), available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/educ/
nclb report.htm.
51. See MARTHA DERTHICK, KEEPING THE COMPOUND REPUBLIC 27 (2001) (noting
that, unlike federal grants for welfare and highways, federal education grants did not
clearly enhance state power at localities' expense, and in particular that certain Title I
grants "administered directly to local districts ... were conceived of in Washington as a
means to outflank the state educational agencies, which were presumed to be stagnant and
conservative"); John F. Jennings, Title I: Its Legislative History and Its Promise, in TITLE
I: COMPENSATORY EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS 1, 5 (Geoffrey D. Borman et al.
eds., 2001) (stating that the legislative purpose of Title I was "to provide financial
assistance to school districts serving concentrations of poor children"); Molly S. McUsic,
The Law's Role in the Distribution of Education: The Promises and Pitfalls of School
Finance Litigation, in LAW AND SCHOOL REFORM: SIX STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING
EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 88, 94 (Jay Heubert ed., 1999); Michael Janofsky, Federal
Spending Increases, but More Schools Will Get Less Money for Low-Income Students, N.Y.
TIMES, July 4, 2005, at A9 (summarizing impacts of recent changes in federal rules for
distributing Title I aid).
52. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act requires states to provide
disabled children with a "free appropriate public education." 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(d)(1)(A),
1401(8) (2000).
53. See, e.g., Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968) (holding that a
school district that had maintained schools that were de jure racially discriminatory bore
an "affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary
system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch"). Michael
Kirst dates a national erosion in "confidence in local school boards and administrators" to
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See Kirst, supra note 19, at 22.
54. See, e.g., Brenda J. Buote, Special Needs Expense Mounts, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug.
1, 2004, at Globe North 1 (reporting that six Boston-area school districts allocated more
than twenty percent of their total budgets to special education in 2002-03); Editorial,
D.C.'s Special Special-Ed Crisis, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2005, at A20 (noting that thirty-
nine percent of fiscal year 2006 school budget in Washington, D.C. will go to special
education); James Fuller, Full-Day Kindergarten Growing in Popularity, CHI. DAILY
HERALD, Apr. 5, 2004, at 1 (reporting that at least twenty percent of the budget of the
Prospect Heights, Illinois Elementary School District consistently goes to special
education).
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desegregation orders that subject the most minute details of their
spending and administration to the supervision of federal judges,55 it
cannot be said that these federal incursions into state and local
authority are de minimis. Indeed, school desegregation and the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA")56 are in an
important sense harbingers of the more ambitious, recent federal
intrusions into district power discussed below. At the same time,
these federal initiatives were consciously limited to providing equality
of educational opportunity to outsider groups of students who might
otherwise be ignored by districts and states. In that sense,
Washington's traditional involvement in schooling was marginal; the
federal government's focus was minority student populations, and it
was satisfied to leave everything else to the vagaries of majority-ruled
political institutions. 7  Even when dealing with minority rights,
moreover, when cases involved a direct challenge to educational
localism, the Court repeatedly "confronted the bedrock of localism
and drew back."58
The closest analogue in American politics to the system here
described is dual federalism, which political scientists also call "layer-
cake federalism."59 Operationally, dual federalism is an arrangement
whereby multiple, hierarchically organized governments share
sovereignty over a given area, but in which each operates within its
own, well-defined sphere.' Dual federalism has been largely
55. See REED, supra note 43, at 129; see also, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 78-
79 (1995) (describing a particularly "ambitious and expensive" court-ordered remedial
program).
56. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487.
57. In Orfield's perspicacious description, "[tjhe 1964 Civil Rights Act made the
central government responsible for active protection of certain Negro rights, even while
the generally passive relationship with local authority in other fields was to continue."
ORFIELD, supra note 24, at 311.
58. DERTHICK, supra note 51, at 24. The Court has held repeatedly that states'
delegation of authority and power to school districts is a practice with a history, pedigree,
and practical importance so substantial as to limit the scope of potential remedies for what
are arguably federal constitutional violations. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-
42 (1974) (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)).
59. See MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 60-80 (1966); DAVID B.
WALKER, THE REBIRTH OF FEDERALISM: SLOUCHING TOWARDS WASHINGTON 23
(1995).
60. For this purpose I adopt the "operational version of dual federalism," rather than
a version grounded in constitutional theory. See WALKER, supra note 59, at 23-34
(describing an "operational version of dual federalism"); cf WILLIAM H. RIKER,
FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 11 (1964) (discussing an
operationalized version of federalism generally). Schooling is unlike the federalism of the
American states in that it has no constitutional version: while dual federalism is based in
the U.S. Constitution as well as in government practice, see JEFFREY R. HENIG, PUBLIC
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debunked as an inadequate description of general American
governmental practice by political scientists who emphasize the
interpenetration of various levels of government across a very wide
range of government activities.6' But American schooling was long an
exception to this pattern; instead it long retained the genuinely,
though not absolutely, dual character that once described much of
state and local government. 6  The traditional system of educational
governance continued to be characterized by a hierarchy clear in
theory and somewhat blurred in practice; by substantial
implementation power assigned to the bottom layer; and by
important but quite restricted arenas in which an individual or group
dissatisfied by the decision of one layer might find recourse by appeal
to another.63 De jure, the state may have been the boss, and appeals
to its supremacy from those unhappy with their districts could
occasionally succeed; but de facto, the street-level bureaucrats
working for the district ran the show.
B. No More Layers
Recent events have taken a mixmaster to the orderly layer cake
of school governance. Although the layers remain identifiable, school
government is starting to look more like the rest of American local
government: "[T]he functions of government are not in neat layers.
Rather, they are all mixed up: marbled, to use the baker's term. And
in no neat order: chaotic, to use the reformer's term. ' 64
POLICY AND FEDERALISM: ISSUES IN STATE AND LOCAL POLITICS 14-15 (1985), the
"federal" structure of states and districts exists independent of, indeed in spite of, written
state constitutions, which grant plenary power to states and render districts legally
contingent. But as a matter of positive political science, federalism need not be
constitutionalized. See BERMAN, supra note 34, at 5 (quoting Harvey C. Mansfield's
statement that the institutions of state and local politics "make state-local relations usually
in fact federal, whatever the theoretical plentitude of state powers") (citing Harvey C.
Mansfield, Functions of State and Local Governments, in THE 50 STATES AND THEIR
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 108 (James W. Fester ed., 1967)); supra notes 32-37 and
accompanying text.
61. See RIKER, supra note 60, at 10.
62. See DERTHICK, supra note 51, at 45 ("Historically, then, the states did not actually
do very much. Having created a framework of law within which local governments
functioned, they did not closely supervise its application."); cf id. at 13-17 (discussing
historical changes in localism generally). In the context of education, one might describe
the role played by Washington as a third, thin layer, perhaps the icing on the layer cake.
63. See generally THOMAS J. ANTON, AMERICAN FEDERALISM AND PUBLIC POLICY:
HOW THE SYSTEM WORKS (1989) (describing interrelationships between different actors
in the federal system).
64. RIKER, supra note 60, at 10. Riker, followed by many others, identifies this as a
"marble cake" model.
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1. The New Accountability
The first dramatic change, in the 1980s, was a new education
activism in state capitals. Pushed in several instances by state courts,
legislatures and governors found themselves providing an increasingly
large share of a growing education budget.65 Where prior to 1930
states provided twenty percent of all school funds to districts' eighty
percent,66 state spending for schools surpassed local spending in the
mid-1970s. 67  In 2002-03 states provided 48.7% of all school funds
while districts provided 42.8%.68 With states' growing financial stakes
came renewed interest in controlling the use of state monies,69 and a
period of "unprecedented [state] legislative activity" began. 7' The
quantity and scope of state legislative and administrative rules
governing school district activity exploded.71 Areas for new initiatives
and regulation included "increased high school graduation
requirements, more student testing, changes in teacher certification
and compensation[,] ... new ways of assessing student performance,
and efforts to encourage school-based innovation. 72 In some states,
the initiatives in this last group also included school-based
management ("SBM"), which devolves budgeting, purchasing, and
policy decisions once held at the district level to building principals.73
65. See Sheila E. Murray et al., Education-Finance Reform and the Distribution of
Education Resources, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 789, 790 (1998) ("We find court-mandated
reform of school-finance systems reduces within-state inequality in spending by 19 to 34
percent .... In aggregate, nearly all additional funds came from state sources.").
Nationwide, spending per pupil increased fifty-three percent from 1972 to 1992, from
$3,642 to $5,576. Id. at 799.
66. John Meyer et al., Centralization, Fragmentation, and School District Complexity,
32 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 186, 186 (1987) (citing Denis P. Doyle & Chester E. Finn, Jr., American
Schools and the Future of Local Control, 77 PUB. INT. 77 (1984)).
67. DERTHICK, supra note 51, at 27.
68, JASON HILL & FRANK JOHNSON, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., REVENUES AND
EXPENDITURES FOR PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION: SCHOOL
YEAR 2002-03,5 fig.1 (2005), available at http://nces. ed.gov/pubs2005/2005353.pdf.
69. See BERMAN, supra note 34, at 33.
70. Susan H. Fuhrman, Legislatures and Education Policy, in THE GOVERNANCE OF
CURRICULUM 30, 31 (Richard F. Elmore & Susan H. Fuhrman eds., 1994).
71. See Briffault, supra note 32, at 30-35.
72. Susan H. Fuhrman & Richard F. Elmore, Governors and Education Policy in the
1990s, in THE GOVERNANCE OF CURRICULUM, supra note 70, at 56, 57.
73. See generally James M. Ferris, School-Based Decision Making: A Principal-Agent
Perspective, 14 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL'Y ANALYSIS 333 (1992); E. Mark Hanson,
School-Based Management and Educational Reform in the United States and Spain, 34
COMP. EDUC. REV. 523 (1990); Priscilla Wohlstetter & Susan Albers Mohrman, School-
Based Management: Promise and Process, CPRE FIN. BRIEFS (Consortium for Policy
Research in Educ. Fin. Ctr., Madison, Wis.), Dec. 1994, available at http://www.cpre.org/
Publications/fb05.pdf.
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SBM is noteworthy because while in one aspect its decentralized
approach opposes the centralizing trend, in another light the policy
shares with centralizing initiatives a state decision to reassign to other
actors responsibilities that had belonged to districts.
As important as the substance of state forays into what had
traditionally been areas of local authority was a view in the states that
these steps were necessitated by failure at the local level. Professor
Susan Fuhrman, for example, complained that states' new activism
was confrontational rather than collaborative, many legislators having
concluded that "local educators would not improve in the absence of
stringent state standards and severe sanctions." 4 Fuhrman concluded
that prospects for her preferred approach, few-strings-attached state
aid to local districts based upon "trust," were dim.75
Fuhrman was right. By the mid-1990s, the dominant mood in the
states was that it was time to get tough with local districts that would
not or could not perform.76 Most states adopted programs that
required districts to meet or exceed floors for standardized test
scores, attendance rates, graduation rates, and other indicators.77
Under these programs, which came collectively to be known under
the rubric of the "New Accountability," failure is accompanied by
requirements for reorganization and technical assistance, and
repeated failure by an escalating series of sanctions.78 Such sanctions
limit district autonomy quite onerously. For example, several New
Accountability statutes permit the "reconstitution" of inadequate
schools, requiring the district to dismiss and replace the faculty and
staff of schools whose performance is found to be inadequate.7 9
74. Fuhrman, supra note 70, at 44.
75. See id. at 45.
76. See Saiger, supra note 10, at 1674-75.
77. See Amy Stuart Wells, Introduction to WHERE CHARTER SCHOOL POLICY FAILS
1, 4-5 (Amy Stuart Wells ed., 2002); Saiger, supra note 10, at 1675 & n.70; cf. Herbert J.
Walberg, Real Accountability, in OUR SCHOOLS AND OUR FUTURE: ARE WE STILL AT
RISK? 305, 306-17 (Paul E. Peterson ed., 2003) (surveying provisions of state
accountability programs that regulate curriculum and testing).
78. See Saiger, supra note 10, at 1656-58 nn.2-4, 1674-76.
79. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-15-430(a)(5) (Supp. 2003) (authorizing the State Board
of Education to require the reconstitution of a school district in academic distress); GA.
CODE ANN. § 20-14-41(a)(4) (Supp. 2004) (authorizing "complete reconstitution" of any
school that "has received an unacceptable rating for a period of three consecutive years or
more"); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/34-8.3(d) (Supp. 2005) (authorizing the dismissal of
the principal, faculty, and other personnel of a nonperforming school after a probationary
period); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 4-309 (2004) (outlining the local school
administration's role in Baltimore City for aiding schools put on reconstitution notice);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.528 (Supp. 2005) (authorizing reconstitution of urban high
school academies, defined as public schools under Michigan's constitution, if the academy
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New Accountability sanctions also directly take on the very
institution of district governance. Since 1989, nearly half the states
have, under their New Accountability rules, disestablished, or "taken
over," at least one school district that has failed to perform under a
New Accountability program. 0 Disestablishment takes reconstitution
one step further: it involves a state's dismissal of local district
leadership deemed corrupt or incompetent and replacing it with state
officials or their designees.81 Disestablishment sanctions continue to
be used actively.'
A variant of this policy with similar effects is school district
consolidation. States, while respecting the institution of the school
district and its traditional authority, have long engaged in merging
neighboring school districts, a process that reduced the number of
districts nationwide from 117,108 in 1940 to 15,367 in 1992.83 Only a
few of these consolidations were demanded by federal courts in the
context of desegregation decrees;14 most were orthogonal both to
fails to meet educational goals established under contract); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-7.1-5
(Supp. 2004) (granting Board of Regents authority to restructure schools' governance,
budget, program, and personnel); cf. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-17-6(14)(a)(i) (Supp. 2004)
(giving an appointed conservator assigned to a school failing to meet accreditation
standards the authority to terminate, deny renewal, or reassign any certified or
noncertified personnel within a district); NEV. REV. STAT. § 385.3773(1)(c) (LexisNexis
Supp. 2002) (authorizing dismissal of district employees identified as having contributed to
a school's failure); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 21-2-304(a)(vi)(D) (Supp. 2004) ("Teacher and
administrator quality and student remediation are the focus of consequences imposed
upon schools failing to meet school improvement and performance criteria and target
levels.").
80. More than fifty districts have been disestablished as a sanction for poor
performance since 1989. See BERMAN, supra note 34, at 121; Saiger, supra note 10, at 1689
& n.137.
81. See Saiger, supra note 10, at 1674.
82. For a disestablishment since the publication of the last compilation, referenced in
note 80, see David J. Hoff, Texas Chief Ousts Troubled District's Elected Board, EDUC.
WK., May 18, 2005, at 3 (reporting that an elected board of education and appointed
superintendent in Wilmer-Hutchins, Texas were "deposed" by the state Commissioner of
Education and replaced with her own appointees because of "financial and academic
problems").
83. See Kathleen Cotton, School Size, School Climate, and Student Performance
(May 1996), http://www.nwrel.org/scpd/sirs/10/c020.html. The consolidation trend lost
steam in the 1970s; by 1977 there were already fewer than 17,000 districts nationally. See
MORPHET ET AL., supra note 18, at 241.
84. See, e.g., Evans v. Buchanan, 416 F. Supp. 328, 352 (D. Del. 1976); LINO A.
GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND
THE SCHOOLS 146-59 (1976) (collecting United States Supreme Court decisions in which
districts were forced either to split or consolidate in service of desegregation); see also
Leland Ware, Brown's Uncertain Legacy: High Stakes Testing and the Continuing
Achievement Gap, 35 U. TOL. L. REV. 841, 844 (2004) (citing Evans and noting its remedy
as unusual).
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questions of race and achievement, being justified instead by
pedagogical and efficiency concerns. With the New Accountability,
however, consolidation has joined disestablishment as a sanction for
nonperformance.86
Both disestablishment and consolidation make local control itself
contingent upon satisfying the state. Their imposition is thus not only
a punishment for districts that have failed to meet state requirements,
but also a threat hanging over struggling districts and an incentive for
them to improve.87
2. No Child Left Behind
With the passage of the Federal No Child Left Behind Act of
2001 ("NCLB" or "the Act"),88 federal as well as state law came to
incorporate the basic principles of the New Accountability's assault
upon district autonomy. As noted above, 9 Washington has for
decades intervened in school management in order to protect
marginalized student populations, most notably racial minorities, the
disabled, and to a lesser extent girls and women. Desegregation
decrees, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act,9" and Title
IX91 trump districts' discretion over such core matters as pupil
placement, tracking, discipline, and budgets.' Notwithstanding these
85. See BERMAN, supra note 34, at 132; MORPHET ET AL., supra note 18, at 240-41;
Tyack, supra note 39, at 15; Wirt, supra note 39, at 518.
86. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-17-13 (1999 & Supp. 2004) (providing that after a
school district is abolished due to failure and the failures have been corrected, the state
board of education shall reconstitute, reorganize or change the boundaries of the previous
district); N.M. STAT. § 22-4-3(c)(3) (2003) (providing that state board can order
consolidation if the school district receives a disapproval accreditation status); TEX. EDUC.
CODE ANN. § 39.131(a)(10)(A) (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2004-05) (providing that the state
may "annex [a] district to one or more adjoining districts" if the "district has been rated as
academically unacceptable for a period of two years or more"); see also David J. Hoff,
Tiny Border District in Texas Ordered by State To Dissolve, EDUC. WK., May 11, 2005, at 4
(reporting on a district dissolved "by the state because of its poor academic performance
and an unsafe facility").
87. See Saiger, supra note 10, at 1677-90.
88. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001,20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6578 (Supp. 112002).
89. See supra notes 47-58 and accompanying text.
90. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487 (2000 & Supp. 2005).
91. Id. § 1681 (prohibiting discrimination "on the basis of sex" in "any educational
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance").
92. Regarding desegregation, see, for example, Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 78-79
(1995) (describing budgetary implications of desegregation order); Ho ex rel. Ho v. San
Francisco Unified School District, 147 F.3d 854, 859 (9th Cir. 1998) (voiding local pupil
placement policies because they perpetuate racially identifiable schools); People Who
Care v. Rockford Board of Education, 851 F. Supp. 905, 912-15 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (same);
and Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 406-07 (D.D.C. 1967) (voiding a local tracking
system because it perpetuates racially identifiable schools).
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incursions, NCLB represents a new and unprecedented ratcheting up
of federal involvement in the day-to-day affairs of school districts.93
NCLB requires schools and school districts to make "adequate yearly
progress" in student performance as measured by standardized tests.94
Progress, defined increasingly stringently as time passes,95 must be
achieved not only for the student population as a whole but also for
federally-designated racial and demographic subgroups of students.96
For schools that receive federal funds, failure to make progress as
defined triggers an escalating series of sanctions; these include not
only public designation as a "failing" school or district but such
draconian punishments as school reconstitution and district
takeover.97
This scheme dramatically restricts districts' freedom both to set
policy goals and to select educational methods. Curricular priorities
are driven by the content and difficulty of the standardized tests,
Regarding students with disabilities, see, for example, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A)
(Supp. 2005) (requiring districts to place disabled children in mainstream environments
"to the maximum extent appropriate"); Cedar Rapids Community School District v. Garret
F. ex rel. Charlene F., 526 U.S. 66, 76-78 (1999) (describing the budgetary implications of
IDEA); UNITED STATES GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, STUDENT DISCIPLINE:
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT 4-10 (2002), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ d01210.pdf (noting implications of IDEA for disciplinary
policy, but arguing that in actual practice IDEA constrains discipline relatively little); and
Lauren Zykorie, Reauthorizing Discipline for the Disabled Student: Will Congress Create a
Better Balance in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)?, 3 CONN. PUB.
INT. L.J. 101, 150 (2003) (arguing against IDEA's dual disciplinary system).
Regarding Title IX, see, for example, Barbara Osborne & Clare Duffy, Title IX,
Sexual Harassment, and Policies at NCAA Division IA Athletics Departments, 15 J. LEGAL
ASPECTS OF SPORT 59, 63 (2005) (describing budgetary and disciplinary implications of
Title IX); Cynthia Lee A. Pemberton, Wrestling with Title IX, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV.
163, 168-69 (2003) (describing additional budgetary implications of Title IX); and Gary J.
Simson, Separate But Equal and Single-Sex Schools, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 443, 447-48
(2005) (discussing the role of Title IX in the transformation of public single-sex schools
into co-educational schools during the 1970s and 1980s).
93. See Patrick McGuinn, The National Schoolmarm: No Child Left Behind and the
New Educational Federalism, 35 PUBLIUS 41, 59 (2005) (noting state opposition to NCLB
as overintrusive, and citing a 2004 resolution of Virginia House of Delegates arguing that
NCLB "represents the most sweeping intrusions into state and local control of education
in the history of the United States"); id. at 66 (concluding that NCLB marks "a
significantly transformed and expanded national role in our country's schools"); James E.
Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 937
(2004) (describing the Act as "remarkably ambitious and unusually intrusive").
94. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2) (Supp. 112002).
95. See id. § 6311(b)(2)(H); see also Ryan, supra note 93, at 946-47 (noting that states
can delay but not foreclose the bite of the average yearly progress requirements).
96. § 6311(b)(3)(C)(xiii).
97. Id. § 6316(b); see also Saiger, supra note 10, at 1720-21 (cataloging sanctions
under NCLB).
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which under the NCLB are set by the state, not the district.98 And
although nominally agnostic about the means by which districts are to
achieve average yearly progress, teaching to the test is a predictable
response of districts facing high-stakes sanctions. Moreover, NCLB's
agnosticism with respect to means is spotty, as evidenced by its
requirements that districts having difficulty use only teaching
methods "based on scientific research"99 and that children be taught
by "highly qualified" teachers' 0°-two provisions that have inspired
particular acrimony among educators. 1 1 Finally, NCLB subjects
districts not only to pressure from Washington but to additional
regulation from state education officials anxious to assure compliance
with its terms. °2
In short, NCLB has greatly constrained districts' behavior as they
struggle with its mandates.103 That curriculum and teaching have been
substantially affected is further evident from the quantity and volume
of browbeating about the Act among educators, who have worried
publicly and loudly that teaching to state-set standardized tests blights
pedagogy, favoring mindless rote learning and drill over higher-order
98. See Ryan, supra note 93, at 941-42. Kevin Kosar notes disapprovingly that
regulations under the NCLB still allow certain local variations notwithstanding the Act's
mandate for consistent statewide standards. See KOSAR, supra note 48, at 208-09.
99. § 6316(b)(3)(A).
100. Id. § 6319.
101. See, e.g., Marcella L. Kysilka, No Child Left Behind: What Does It Really Mean?,
5 CURRICULUM & TEACHING DIALOGUE 99, 101-02 (2003) (describing NCLB's
definition of "scientifically-based research" as "unfortunate" and "narrow," and
expressing strong skepticism about its requirement that teachers be highly qualified);
Elizabeth Adams St. Pierre, Refusing Alternatives: A Science of Contestation, 10
QUALITATIVE INQUIRY 130, 133 (2004) ("[T]he federal government and certain
'scientists' are once again attempting to reduce science to a narrow scientism that does not
foster the democratic values of diverse epistemological and methodological approaches to
knowledge production.").
102. See Teresa Dahmus, Note, The Effects of the No Child Left Behind Act on the
Balance of Power Among Local, State, and Federal Educational Authorities, 16 LBJ J.
PUBl. AFF. 20,21 (2003).
103. See, e.g., James Harvey, The Matrix Reloaded, 61 EDUC. LEADERSHIP 18, 20
(2003) ("[NCLB] makes a mockery of local control .... [It] has moved education
decisions as far as possible from the classroom. Federal officials can now make decisions
that would have been unimaginable even a few years ago. They have established the
criteria for disciplining schools; removing principals and teachers; and even defining
appropriate curriculum, reading materials, and instructional practice."); George J.
Petersen & Michelle D. Young, The No Child Left Behind Act and Its Influence on
Current and Future District Leaders, 33 J.L. & EDUC. 343, 352-54 (2004) (arguing that
NCLB imposes "a loss of control" upon low-performing schools that "makes school
improvement very difficult, if not impossible").
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critical thinking and creativity."° At a more quotidian level, reports
abound that schools concerned about their NCLB performance have
rearranged their curriculum to focus on reading and mathematics
exams at the expense of music, art, field trips, and even recess. The
federal government's fingerprints are now everywhere in district
governance. 106
3. Choice and Charters
Power, then, is being rearranged among the layers of government
involved in education. The states have transferred power from
districts to themselves and, sometimes, to individual schools; the
federal government too has transferred power from districts, and also
from states, to itself. 107 But intergovernmental power shifts are only
part of the story. The other major erosion of district power and
autonomy is associated with the rise of school choice. In the layer-
104. See Robert J. Sternberg, Good Intentions, Bad Results: A Dozen Reasons Why the
No Child Left Behind Act Is Failing Our Schools, EDUC. WK., Oct. 27, 2004, at 42 (NCLB
causes schools to "regress[] to ... the drill-and-kill education method of many years ago
.... [S]chools have become, to a large extent, test-preparation courses."); George Wood,
A View from the Field: NCLB's Effects on Classrooms and Schools, in MANY CHILDREN
LEFT BEHIND: How THE No CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT IS DAMAGING OUR CHILDREN
AND OUR SCHOOLS 33, 39 (Deborah Meier & George Woods eds., 2004) ("Teachers
across the map complain that the joy is being drained from teaching as their work is
reduced to passing out worksheets and drilling children as if they were in dog obedience
school."); Anne C. Lewis, An 'Incomplete' for the New Brand of Federalism, PHI DELTA
KAPPAN, Sept. 2003, at 3 (noting that federal grants encourage the exclusive adoption of
phonics curricula for beginning readers).
105. In a survey of elementary school principals, twenty-five percent reported
decreased instructional time dedicated to the arts because of NCLB, and thirty-three
percent predict future decline. An estimated forty percent of elementary schools have
reduced or eliminated recess in favor of test preparation and drills. Margaret McKenna &
David Haselkorn, NCLB and the Lessons of Columbine, USA TODAY, May 1, 2005
(Magazine), at 20; accord Wood, supra note 104, at 42-43.
106. But see KOSAR, supra note 48, at 195 (arguing that, notwithstanding its
unprecedented ratcheting up of federal involvement in education, NCLB "left the heart of
education, curricula, where it always has been: in the hands of localities and states").
107. States and districts both are beginning to resist the encroachments on their own
authority associated with NCLB. See Sch. Dist. v. Spellings, No. 05-CV-71535-DT, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29,253, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 23, 2005) (dismissing, for failure to state a
claim, challenge to NCLB brought by eight local school districts and the National
Education Association). Connecticut was the first state to file a legal challenge to the Act.
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Connecticut v. Spellings, No. 305CV1330
(D. Conn. Aug. 22, 2005); see also Sam Dillon, "Soccer Mom" Education Chief Plays
Hardball for Bush Team, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2005, at Al (in 2004 "Connecticut was
disputing the law's testing requirements, Texas the rules on disabled students, North
Dakota its teacher certification procedures, Utah what the authorities there consider its
usurpation of local educational control, and California its system for labeling failing
schools."); cf TASK FORCE ON NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND, supra note 50, at 6-8, 11
(endorsing the view that NCLB unconstitutionally encroaches upon state prerogatives).
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cake days, school districts were monopolists, and all parents unwilling
to pay for private education were by law required to be their
customers. State redistribution of district power across state agencies,
districts, and schools, however momentous for districts, works no
change in the reality of this public-school monopoly. But choice does.
Choice forces school districts to compete for students and for funds.
A daydream for libertarians only fifteen years ago, choice today is a
major feature of the educational landscape and the competition it
engenders has vital consequences for school districts.
"Choice" describes a multitude of policies.08 The most sweeping
of these is state-funded private school choice, an approach made
famous by the voucher program in Cleveland that was held
constitutional in 2002 by the United States Supreme Court.1°9
Vouchers allow parents to direct funding that would otherwise have
gone to their child's home public school district to other institutions
both public and private. 110 Each cashed voucher both directs money
to the chosen institution and takes it away frcm the home district. 1 '
Moreover, although the state may regulate schools that wish to
redeem vouchers, 12 such regulation is generally minimal.113 Private
schools accepting vouchers remain private and give parents access to
a wide range of education options and approaches that the district
does not (and in the case of religious education, cannot) offer.
Voucher schools thus offer parents a way to escape district policies
across a range of issues-from curriculum and tracking to discipline
and class size-that they dislike. As proponents of choice argue,
parents gain through such programs a way to exit the public-school
monopoly without having to relocate, which is the way that wealthier
families traditionally exercise their exit option."14
108. See HOCHSCHILD & SCOVRONICK, supra note 13, at 107-32.
109. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 644 (2002).
110. In Cleveland at the time of the Zelman case, private schools within the city of
Cleveland and public, but not private, schools outside of Cleveland, were permitted to
participate in the program. Id. at 647. Fifty-six Cleveland private schools were
participating when the case was decided. Id. at 613. Not surprisingly, none of Cleveland's
neighboring public school districts had accepted the state's invitation to educate the city's
children. See id. at 647; infra notes 324-27 and accompanying text.
111. See, e.g., Zelman, 536 U.S. at 645 (describing this feature of the Cleveland
program).
112. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman's Future: Vouchers, Sectarian
Providers, and the Next Round of Constitutional Battles, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 917,
972-82 (2003).
113. See R. KENNETH GOODWIN & FRANK R. KEMERER, SCHOOL CHOICE
TRADEOFFS 222-24 (2002).
114. See Jeffrey R. Henig & Stephen D. Sugarman, The Nature and Extent of School
Choice, in SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL CONTROVERSY 1, 14-17 (Stephen D. Sugarman
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In theory, vouchers pose an existential threat to school districts.
Sovereign parent-consumers, armed with the public resources that
society has chosen to devote to the education of their children, have
no reason in choosing among competing schools to care if a school is
public or private, or which "district" runs it. To a consumer in a
market, a school district is indistinguishable from other educational
providers: if it attracts students it thrives, and if it fails it collapses.
But the threat of vouchers has not bridged the chasm from theory to
fact. Real-world voucher programs are hedged with restrictions: they
limit who can receive voucher money,"' cap the total number of
vouchers available, restrict the categories of institutions that can
redeem vouchers,116 and limit the amount of the voucher to a fraction
& Frank R. Kemerer eds., 1999) ("Many families first decide precisely where they want
their children to go to school, and having done that, they find a house or apartment in the
right location," but the power to choose is unequally distributed with "income and
wealth"); James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice, 111
YALE L.J. 2043, 2064 (2002) ("[T]he overwhelming majority of well-to-do parents ... have
already exercised a form of school choice" by "select[ing] where to live based on the
quality of public schools." (citing Henig & Sugarman, supra)); supra notes 41-44 and
accompanying text; cf. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 680 (Thomas, J., concurring) (voucher program
"simply gives parents a greater choice as to where and in what manner to educate their
children. This is choice that those with greater means have routinely exercised." (citation
omitted)).
115. At the time of Zelman, poor families resident in Cleveland had priority to
participate in the voucher program. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 644, 646. Ohio has since
extended the program to include students who attend any school that has been in
"academic emergency for three consecutive years." Christina Samuels & Karla Scoon
Reid, Ohio OKs Vouchers for Pupils in Low-Rated Schools, EDUC. WK., July 13, 2005, at
23. Milwaukee's voucher program limits eligible students to those whose family income
does not exceed 1.75 times the federal poverty line. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602,
608 (Wis. 1998). Florida's voucher program, until the Florida Supreme Court held it to be
unconstitutional in 2006, see Bush v. Holmes, Nos. SC04-2323, SC04-2324, SC04-2335,
2006 WL 20584 (Fla. Jan. 5, 2006), made eligible all students enrolled in a public school
found to be failing by the state for two years in a four-year period. FLA. STAT.
§ 1002.38(1) (Supp. 2005). Vouchers made available by Congress to students in
Washington, D.C. are also limited to poor students whose assigned public schools
underperform. See Goodwin Liu & William L. Taylor, School Choice to Achieve
Desegregation, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 791, 813 n.106 (2005); Patrick Wolf, Evaluation of
the DC Opportunity Scholarship Program, 10 GEO. PUB. POL'Y REv. 85,85 (2005).
During the 1999-2000 school year, 7,900 of all eligible Milwaukee students, 3,600
of all eligible Cleveland students, and 119 of all eligible Florida students were granted
vouchers. See NANCY KOBER, CTR. ON EDUC. POLICY, SCHOOL VOUCHERS: WHAT WE
KNOW AND DON'T KNOW ... AND How WE COULD KNOW MORE 13 & tbl.1 (2000),
available at http://www.ctredpol.org/vouchers/schoolvouchers.pdf. In the first year of the
Washington program, 2004-05, 1,366 vouchers were awarded and 1,027 were used. Wolf,
supra, at 86-87. Cleveland's, Milwaukee's, and Washington's programs allow vouchers to
be redeemed at private and religious schools; Florida's program also included public
schools with acceptable ratings. See KOBER, supra, Wolf, supra, at 85, 87.
116. See, e.g., Zelman, 536 U.S. at 645 (describing this feature of the Cleveland
program).
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of the market price for private schooling.117 Notwithstanding Zelman,
voucher programs continue to be subject to challenges under state
constitutional law."8 And voucher programs are not always popular.
Voters have rejected them in California and Michigan," 9 the NCLB's
choice sanctions have been implemented only sporadically,120 and the
Florida Supreme Court declared that state's voucher law
unconstitutional. 121 Thus, while the voucher threat to public school
districts remains vivid in the abstract, vouchers have not created a
crisis for districts on the ground.
The same cannot be said of charter schools. Charters are
publicly-funded schools whose ties to the school district in which they
are located are nonexistent or de minimis. They are founded,
organized, and run not by the district or the state but by self-
organizing groups of education entrepreneurs-parents, teachers, or
third parties.122  In various surface ways, charters finesse the
ideological challenge posed by voucher programs. Charter schools
receive only public funds, and may not require tuition or tuition
copayments; they are thus "public schools.' 1 23  In some states the
same institutions that accredit school districts also certify charter
schools, and in others charter schools must apply for their authorizing
"charter" to the local school district with which they plan to
117. At the time of Zelman, the Cleveland voucher was for $2,250 and when used in its
entirety required an additional $250 parental copayment. Id. at 646. The new Ohio
program sets the voucher amount at $5,000. Samuels & Reid, supra note 115, at 22.
Milwaukee's voucher was for $5,553 in 2001-02. Milwaukee Parental Choice Program,
Wis. Dep't of Pub. Instruction, MPCP Facts and Figures for 2001-02 2 (Feb. 2002),
http://dpi.wis.gov/sms/doc/mpcOlfnf.doc. Florida's was $4,000. KOBER, supra note 115, at
13.
118. See Owens v. Colo. Cong. of Parents, Teachers & Students, 92 P.3d 933, 936
(Colo. 2004) (voiding a Colorado voucher program that allowed children struggling
academically to receive private school vouchers as inconsistent with the Colorado
Constitution's local control provisions); Holmes, 2006 WL 20584, at *8 (voiding Florida's
voucher program as inconsistent with the Florida Constitution's requirement that the state
maintain a "uniform ... and high quality system of free public schools" (emphasis and
citation omitted)); cf. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 112, at 957-72 (discussing post-Zelman
challenges to voucher programs under state constitutions).
119. Alan Wolfe, The Irony of School Choice: Liberals, Conservatives, and the New
Politics of Race, in SCHOOL CHOICE: THE MORAL DEBATE 31, 38-39 (Alan Wolfe ed.,
2003).
120. See, e.g., Laura Diamond, Student Transfers Almost Double, ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
Aug. 4,2005, at Gwinnett News 1JJ (describing transfers in Gwinnett County, Georgia).
121. Holmes, 2006 WL 20584, at *2.
122. See Bruce Fuller, Growing Charter Schools, Decentering the State, in INSIDE
CHARTER SCHOOLS: THE PARADOX OF RADICAL DECENTRALIZATION 1, 6-7 (Bruce
Fuller ed., 2000).
123. See CHESTER E. FINN, JR. ET AL., CHARTER SCHOOLS IN ACTION 15 (2000).
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compete.12 4 Regardless of the chartering authority, from districts'
point of view, charters pose the same market-based threat as voucher
programs. Charters are more thoroughly regulated than voucher
schools-they cannot teach a sectarian curriculum, for example 125-
but they are still exempt from many of the regulations and policies
that govern district-run schools.126 In about half the states, the
exemption is general, holding charters "accountable only for the
terms of their charters plus health, safety, and civil rights
requirements.' 1 27  In most states it extends to the seniority-based
teacher selection and placement policies enshrined in district schools'
union contracts."2  Equally important is that funding follows the
charter school student, as it does voucher students. If a student in
district X enrolls in a charter school, the charter, not the school
district, gets the per-pupil amount that the state would otherwise
provide to district X, and, in some states, gets some or all of the
district's per-pupil allocation as well. 29
Like voucher schools, then, charter schools expand parents' exit
options.130 In search of education policies more to their liking, they
124. It of course runs precisely counter to the idea of charter schools that school
districts control the charters of their competitors. See, e.g., PAUL T. HILL & ROBIN J.
LAKE WITH MARY BETH CELLO, CHARTER SCHOOLS AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN PUBLIC
EDUCATION 22 (2002) (noting that California charter schools' effectiveness was seriously
compromised by "requiring [charter] schools to negotiate with their sponsor district for...
flexibility"); Sebastian Mallaby, A Bridge for the Underclass, WASH. POST, June 13, 2005,
at A19 ("[G]iving school boards power over charter schools' facilities is like entrusting
decisions on Wal-Mart to Costco.").
125. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 647 (2002) (noting this
requirement for Cleveland's charter schools).
126. See GOODWIN & KEMERER, supra note 113, at 206-10; HILL & LAKE, supra note
124, at 20-21.
127. HILL & LAKE, supra note 124, at 22.
128. In public schools, these seniority-based systems result in the least experienced and
most poorly-paid teachers being disproportionately assigned to schools and classes with
particularly difficult-to-teach populations. See Fuller, supra note 122, at 6; see also FINN
ET AL., supra note 123, at 175 (quoting California charter school advocate's view that
power to avoid collective bargaining with teachers is "the most important freedom that
charter schools have").
129. See Fuller, supra note 122, at 6; Amy Berk Anderson et al., Educ. Comm'n of the
States, Charter School Finance (Apr. 2003), http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/24/13/2413.
htm; cf Stephen D. Sugarman, School Choice and Public Funding, in SCHOOL CHOICE
AND SOCIAL CONTROVERSY, supra note 114, at 121-24 (comparing implications of
funding charters with both district and state funds to funding with state monies only).
130. Although home schooling predates the choice movement, it shares its animating
idea, that parents should be able to exit the school district without moving or paying for
private school. (Home schoolers, of course, pay with their time.) Thus the rise in home
schooling also demonstrates an expanding use of exit. See J. Gary Knowles et al., From
Pedagogy to Ideology: Origins and Phases of Home Education in the United States, 1970-
[Vol. 84
THE LAST WAVE
can leave their local public school system without relocating, and
public funds will follow their children to their new schools. Unlike
voucher schools, however, the growth of charter schools has been
explosive, transforming charters into an ubiquitous feature of the
education landscape. The first charter school opened in Minnesota in
1992.131 By 1995, eighteen more states had passed charter school
legislation. 13 2 Today, forty-one states and the District of Columbia
have charter school laws, and approximately 3,000 charter schools are
operating. 33
When they were monopolists, public school districts could do as
they pleased, subject only to state regulation and to the satisfaction of
a noticeably uninvolved electorate. As competitors, however, school
districts have no choice but to respond to charters, and for that matter
to voucher schools if they exist in reasonable numbers. Substantial
research demonstrates that districts perceiving a charter or voucher
threat believe themselves constrained to alter their policies in order
to retain parent-customers, and take steps to do so.134 Depending on
the robustness of a district's competitors, it is easy to see how in some
districts the preferences of parents perceived as likely to exit, rather
than of district officials, could come to dominate a district's policy
agenda. Just as district policymaking is less independent and more
constrained as it is regulated more heavily by aggressive states and by
Washington, so is it less independent and more constrained as it is
forced to accommodate the preferences of its customer base.
4. Mayoral Participation
Choice expands the critique of districts by suggesting not only
that districts might not be competent, but that they might not be
necessary. Proponents of choice view the market as an institution
that can compete with and even supplant the school district as an
1990, 100 AM. J. EDUC. 195, 201-02, 204, 206 (1992) (discussing the diversity of parental
motivations for removing children from public school).
131. See Deb Moore, Charter Schools: A Grand Experiment, SCH. PLAN. & MGMT.,
Dec. 2004, http://www.peterli.com/archive/spm799.shtm.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See Saiger, supra note 10, at 1678-80 & nn.82-96 (collecting research). That
public schools feel constrained by competitive threats, and act in light of the constraints
they perceive, does not imply that the changes they make will be successful in the short
term, or in the long term for that matter. See MATTHEW CARNOY ET AL., THE CHARTER
SCHOOL DUST-UP: EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE ON ENROLLMENT AND ACHIEVEMENT
95-97 (2005) (noting studies that argue that test scores for students in traditional public
schools rise when charters are active, but arguing that the weight of the research tends to
show that charters have no positive "competition effect" on public school achievement).
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organizing principle for publicly-funded education.13 The suggestion
that districts are optional has had an impact outside of the choice
context as well. Most dramatically, governors and legislators in a
number of states have recently transferred control of distressed urban
public school systems not to themselves but to local mayors.3 6 Since
1990, a dramatic number of American cities have instituted mayoral
control, including two of the three largest cities in the nation-New
York and Chicago.137 In other states and cities, the possibility of
mayoral control has been prominent in school politics although it has
not been actualized.138
135. See JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA'S
SCHOOLS 27 (1990).
136. This phenomenon is thoroughly explored in MAYORS IN THE MIDDLE: POLITICS,
RACE, AND MAYORAL CONTROL OF URBAN SCHOOLS, (Jeffrey R. Henig & Wilbur C.
Rich eds., 2004) [hereinafter MAYORS IN THE MIDDLE].
137. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 346 (N.Y. 2003)
(discussing mayoral control in New York City); Anthony S. Bryk et al., Chicago School
Reform, in NEW SCHOOLS FOR A NEW CENTURY: THE REDESIGN OF URBAN
EDUCATION 164, 187-89 (Diane Ravitch & Joseph P. Viteritti eds., 1997). Other cities
with mayoral control include Anniston (Ala.), Oakland, Hartford, the District of
Columbia, Baltimore, Detroit, Boston, Cleveland, Philadelphia, and Harrisburg. See
Harrisburg Sch. Dist. v. Zogby, 828 A.2d 1079, 1083 (Pa. 2003); Susan L. DeJarnatt, The
Philadelphia Story: The Rhetoric of School Reform, 72 U. MO. KAN. CITY L. REV. 949,
952 (2004); Jeffrey Mirel, Detroit: "There is Still a Long Road to Travel, and Success is Far
from Assured," in MAYORS IN THE MIDDLE, supra note 136, at 120, 130-49 (discussing
Detroit's mayoral control, which began in 1999); Marion Orr, Baltimore: The Limits of
Mayoral Control, in MAYORS IN THE MIDDLE, supra note 136, at 27, 27-54; John Portz,
Boston: Agenda Setting and School Reform in a Mayor-centric System, in MAYORS IN THE
MIDDLE, supra note 136, at 96, 96-117 (discussing Boston's mayoral control, which began
in 1992); Wilbur C. Rich & Stefanie Chambers, Cleveland: Takeovers and Makeovers Are
Not the Same, in MAYORS IN THE MIDDLE, supra note 136, at 159, 159-86 (discussing
increases in mayoral authority in Cleveland, beginning in 1990); Rachel Gottlieb, City
Schools: Goodbye Trustees; Nation Will Be Watching New Board, HARTFORD COURANT,
Dec. 2, 2002, at B1 (discussing mayoral control in Hartford); Del Stover, Conflict with
Mayor Leads to Ouster of Anniston, Ala., School Board, NAT'L SCH. BD. ASS'N. SCH. BD.
NEWS, July 22, 1997 (discussing mayoral control in Anniston); Michael W. Kirst,
Consortium for Policy Research in Educ., Mayoral Influence, New Regimes, and Public
School Governance 5, 9 (May 2002), available at http://www.cpre.org/Publications/rr49.pdf
(discussing minimal mayoral control over Oakland public schools, beginning in 1999, and
resulting low to moderate mayoral influence). Special note should be taken of the District
of Columbia, which lacks state officials, although it is its own school district and has a
mayor. In Washington, members of Congress advanced the mayoral control policy, first
imposing a control board on the school district, see Shook v. D.C. Fin. Responsibility &
Mgmt. Assistance Auth., 132 F.3d 775, 784 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (upholding the takeover of the
school district by the control board), and then in 2000 legislating mayoral control, see
Jeffrey R. Henig, Washington, D.C.: Race, Issue Definition, and School Board
Restructuring, in MAYORS IN THE MIDDLE, supra note 136, at 191,191-213.
138. These cities include Compton (Cal.), Los Angeles, West Sacramento,
Indianapolis, New Orleans, Kansas City (Mo.), Newark, Buffalo, Rochester, Albany,
Syracuse, Akron, Pittsburgh, Memphis, and Dallas. See Blake Fontenay, Let Mayor Pick
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In its milder version, mayoral control means mayoral
appointment of some or all school board members; 39 in its more
drastic form, independent school governance is abolished and the
schools become one among many city departments rather than a
discrete special government.14 ° Such policies, especially the latter
variety, depart radically from tradition. A "fundamental change in
the way schools are governed," 141 mayoral control is a direct attack
upon the progressive-era principle that schools are special and should
be governed specially, apart from the rough-and-tumble of ordinary
urban politics. To institute mayoral control, especially in the service
of reform, is to identify discrete and specialist governance as part of
the problem, and to proffer ordinary, general-government politics as
a solution.
5. After the Flood
All of the innovations discussed thus far have been widely, but
separately, noticed and analyzed. But their effects are cumulative as
well as individual: collectively, they have rendered school districts
Board, Run Schools, Herenton Suggests; Also Proposes Head Start Takeover by City,
MEMPHIS COM. APPEAL, Jan. 22, 2000, at Al; Catherine Gewertz, L.A. Mayor Steps Up
Bid to Control Schools, EDUC. WK., Jan. 4, 2006, at 3; Chris Gray, Morial Drops Bid for
School Takeover; Mayor Urges Giving New Chief Free Hand, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), July 29, 1999, at Al, available at 1999 WLNR 1162188; James Heaney, Pushing
For Power: Masiello Seeks More Control over City Schools, BUFFALO NEWS, Jan. 10,
1999, at Al; Carmen J. Lee & Eleanor Chute, Mayors in the Schools: Will City Join in
Trend to Give More Control over Board Members?, PITrSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Jan.
21, 2004, at Al; Andrea Neal, Editorial, Mayors in Control of Schools, INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, Apr. 22, 1999, at 22A; Two Visions for Kansas City: Questioning the Canditates,
KAN. CITY STAR (Mo.), Mar. 28, 1999, at Al [hereinafter Two Visions]; Kirst, supra note
137, at 4-5 (discussing mayoral threats in Sacramento and Akron to push for control of the
public schools).
139. This is the approach in Oakland, Baltimore, and Philadelphia. See DeJarnatt,
supra note 137, at 957-58 (discussing Philadelphia); Orr, supra note 137, at 53 (noting that
after 1997, Baltimore's "mayor and the governor jointly appoint the nine-member school
board, [but] school policy is no longer directed by city hall"); Kirst, supra note 137, at 5
(noting that Oakland mayor appointed three of ten board members). Also notable is a
"new governance twist" in Hartford, where the mayor, entitled to appoint five of nine
school board members, selected himself as one of the five and was made the board's
chairman. Catherine Gewertz, Hartford Mayor Heads Board, EDUC. WK., Jan. 4, 2006, at
3.
140. This is the approach in Chicago and New York. See Dorothy Shipps, Chicago:
The National "Model" Reexamined, in MAYORS IN THE MIDDLE, supra note 136, at 59,
76-80; Editorial, Mayoral Control of City Schools, N.Y. TIMES, June 7,2002, at A26.
141. Jeffrey R. Henig & Wilbur C. Rich, Mayor-Centrism in Context, in MAYORS IN
THE MIDDLE, supra note 136, at 3, 6.
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beleaguered, even besieged. 4 ' While local power remains substantial,
it is less broad, less certain, and less consistent across jurisdictions.
Districts have lost power to state agencies, to the federal government,
and to their constituent schools. Districts' very existence is
contingent rather than guaranteed, with adequate performance as the
standard for survival. Local general governments have risen as real
competitors to school districts for control over local education. And
institutions other than governments-charters, voucher schools, and
home schooling-now compete with district schools for enrollments
and the associated financial resources.
All these trends came together strikingly in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina, which, in August 2005, devastated the city of New
Orleans and its already beleaguered school district. Katrina battered
the district's schools, scattered its students, and demolished the local
property tax base upon which its finances depend; only a handful of
the district's schools will open at all during the academic year 2005-
06,143 and the district estimates its losses in the billions of dollars.'
Many people, however, joined Louisiana's Governor Kathleen
Blanco in discerning in the destruction a "golden opportunity" to
relieve the district of power and responsibility.1 45  Notwithstanding
the many failures of general municipal government in New Orleans, it
was the city's schools and not the city itself that became the
immediate target for governmental reorganization. 146 Proposals along
these lines were promptly advanced at local, state, and federal levels,
with school-based management, disestablishment, charters, and
vouchers all in the mix.
142. See William G. Howell, Introduction to BESIEGED, supra note 32, at 21; Kirst,
supra note 19, at 32.
143. See Catherine Gewertz, New Orleans Reopens an Elementary School, EDUC. WK.,
Dec. 7, 2005, at 9.
144. David J. Hoff, Tallying the Costs, Striving to Move Ahead, EDUC. WK., Sept. 14,
2005, at 1.
145. Erik W. Robelen, Louisiana Eyes Plan To Let State Control New Orleans Schools,
EDUC. WK., Nov. 9, 2005, at 1; see also Editorial, A Fresh Chance, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., Nov. 10, 2005, at B-12, available at 2005 WLNR 18296576 ("If you're looking for
some good news amid all the bad news caused by Hurricane Katrina, here's the best we
can do: ... [T]he storm also swept away the city's public school system, which has long
been among the worst in the nation. It's not much, but it's something."); Editorial, A New
Beginning, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Nov. 19, 2005, at 6, available at 2005 WLNR
18707987 (editorializing that New Orleans "has an unprecedented opportunity to remake
its schools"); Robelen, supra (quoting Louisiana's State Superintendent of Education
describing the destruction of the school system as "a silver lining and a once-in-a-lifetime
opportunity").
146. On externally imposed takeovers, receiverships, and restructurings of general
municipal government, see BERMAN, supra note 34, at 114-20.
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A special commission organized by New Orleans Mayor Ray
Nagin, at the local level, proposed divesting the school board of
power by embracing school-based management combined with
decentralized administration. School principals should control hiring
and eighty percent of their school's funds, it suggested;14 7 coordinating
administration would be accomplished by "clusters of 8 to 14 schools
that will function as semiautonomous units," '48 and central district
activity would be "pared to a minimum."'49 The commission argued
that its network model provides flexibility and properly rejects
"comprehensive control" by the district in favor of "strategic
managment.""5 °
This proposal has a certain air of unreality, 5' coming two months
after a special session of the Louisiana Legislature. During that
November 2005 session, the legislature passed, and the governor
subsequently signed, a measure that, although not quite a blanket
disestablishment of the New Orleans district (which had also been
proposed),52 took over the district in most essential respects. 3 The
Act ("Act 35") provided for the transfer of all public schools in school
districts that the state had declared to be "academically in crisis" and
that had school scores below the state (not the district) average to a
statewide and state-managed "Recovery School District.'5 54
Although written in general language, the reference to districts "in
academic crisis" unambiguously targeted New Orleans,155 and the
transfer of schools from local to state hands, unlike in the pre-Katrina
system, was to be automatic. 56 Under Act 35's criteria, 110 New
Orleans schools would come under state jurisdiction, while the local
school board would retain authority over thirteen.5 7  And the
147. Catherine Gewertz, New Orleans Panel Rethinks School System, EDUC. WK., Jan.
11, 2006, at 5.
148. Gary Rivlin, New Orleans Commission to Seek Overhaul of Schools and Transit,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2006, at Al.
149. Gewertz, supra note 147.
150. Id.
151. See id. (noting consultant's view that commission's proposal is complicated "in a
district where most of the schools will answer to state-contracted groups").
152. See Robelen, supra note 145, at 26 (noting proposal of State Representative
Jeffrey Arnold).
153. Act effective Nov. 30, 2005, 2005 La. Acts No. 35, § 1 (to be codified at La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 17:10.7(A)(1)).
154. Id.
155. Erik W. Robelen, Louisiana Heads for New Orleans Takeover, EDUC. WK., Nov.
30, 2005, at 22.
156. § 1, 2005 La. Acts No. 35.
157. Laura Maggi, State to Run Orleans Schools, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans),
Nov. 23, 2005, at 1, available at 2005 WLNR 18934995. Prior to Act 35, the state had taken
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"recovery district shall retain jurisdiction over any school transferred
to it for a period of not less than five school years,' ' 18 with the
potential for lengthy extensions.'59
Although some of these schools will likely be managed by the
state directly, Louisiana is only somewhat better situated than the
local school district to manage scores of schools in a flood zone. Act
35 neatly converts that deficiency into an asset by embracing the
charter school model. 6 ° The state promptly granted several initial
charters and appears poised to grant more.' 6' This permits the state
to avoid an enormous management challenge and simultaneously
creates a constituency of groups that stand to benefit from the
government reorganization. 62 Moreover, the local school board is
itself depending on charters to manage those few schools that remain
under its jurisdiction.'63
The interest in charters was also spurred by activity in
Washington, where Katrina was widely seen as an opening for
introducing choice into the system. Thus Washington provided $21
million to Louisiana for the explicit purpose of opening charter
schools."6 Moreover, advocates of private-school vouchers seized the
"opportunity" of Katrina to explain that market forces could renew
education in New Orleans more quickly and efficiently than any
government.'65 Their views found partial resonance in Congress,
which, after a strenuous debate,166 voted to direct federal aid to
over five New Orleans schools. Robelen, supra note 155, at 26; see also Jessica L. Tonin,
New Orleans Charter Network Gets Underway, EDUC. WK., Jan. 18, 2006, at 1 (describing
opening of locally chartered schools).
158. § 1, 2005 La. Acts No. 35 (to be codified at La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17:10.7(C)(1)).
159. Id. (to be codified at La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17:10.7(C)(2)(b)(ii)) (after five years,
the Recovery District may recommend either that it retain control of the school, close the
school, or return it to local control "with proposed stipulations and conditions for the
return").
160. See id. (to be codified at La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 17:3973(2)(b), 17:3982(A)(1)(b),
17:3983(A)(1)(g), 17:3997(A)(1)(c)) (adjusting the Louisiana Education Code to permit
the Recovery District to issue charters in New Orleans).
161. See Editorial, A New Beginning, supra note 145 (referring to Act 35 as establishing
a "new charter-based system"); Thomas Frank, New Orleans Puts Charter Schools to the
Test, USA TODAY, Nov. 28, 2005, at 1OA; Robelen, supra note 155.
162. See Rebecca Catalenno, Katrina Gives Schools Fresh Slate, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES (Fla.), Nov. 29, 2005, at 1A.
163. See Tonin, supra note 157.
164. See Frank, supra note 161.
165. Milton Friedman, The Promise of Vouchers, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 2005, at A20;
Kathryn Jean Lopez, Vouch for the Kids, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Oct. 5, 2005, http://www.
nationalreview.com/lopez/lopez200510050813.asp.
166. Compare 151 CONG. REC. S12292 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Bingaman that Senate aid to private schools "establishes the first national voucher
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private religious schools, as well as public and secular private schools,
that took in students displaced by the hurricane. 67
Still, the New Orleans School District survives. Even presented
with the "opportunity" of Katrina's devastation, neither the mayor's
commission nor the Louisiana Legislature was willing to dissolve the
New Orleans district in toto, as a relic of an institutional form that
had outlived its usefulness and deserved extinction. A fortiori other
districts not ripped apart by wind and water.168 Except for the strong
urban mayoralty, a governmental form entirely absent in many places
in the United States,169 the district remains the only available unit of
governance that is local enough to control education policy
implementation. 7 ' Exceptional circumstances like New Orleans
aside, districts continue to be a critical locus for reform, 7' if only they
can be induced to become "reforming districts," to take "[them]selves
as the focus for change and ha[ve] a clear theory of change for the
system.' ' 12 But school districts are changing, and are likely to change
even more as a result of pressures put upon them by their
deteriorating legal status. School districts no longer enjoy their
power by virtue of being school districts; rather they must fight for
the power they have and justify its exercise-to other governments, to
individual schools both within and outside of their control, and to
parent-consumers-by virtue of what they do with it. Today the
power of the school district is whatever power it can earn and keep
for the time being.
program"), with id. (statement of Sen. Enzi that the bill does not "resolve the voucher
issue"). See also Neela Banerjee, Senate Votes $1.66 Billion for Storm-Displaced Pupils,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2005, at A22 (discussing the debate).
167. See Eric W. Robelen & Michelle R. Davis, Hurricane Aid Is on the Way to
Districts, Private Schools, EDUC. WK., Jan. 11, 2006, at 1 (describing the legislation and
reporting predictable interest group reaction to its inclusion of private schools: the
National School Boards Association's disappointed characterization of the legislation as
an ill-advised "voucher program," and hope from the Alliance for School Choice that the
legislation would be a "milestone" in the "voucher wars").
168. See Kirst, supra note 19, at 33.
169. See id. at 35.
170. See Larry Cuban, A Solution that Lost its Problem: Centralized Policymaking and
Classroom Gains, in WHO'S IN CHARGE HERE?, supra note 19, at 113; Milbrey W.
McLaughlin & Joan E. Talbert, Reforming Districts, in SCHOOL DISTRICTS AND
INSTRUCTIONAL RENEWAL, supra note 39, at 173, 173 ("For better or for worse, districts
matter fundamentally to school reform outcomes and without effective district
engagement, school-by-school reforms are bound to disappoint.").
171. See generally SCHOOL DISTRICTS AND INSTRUCTIONAL RENEWAL, supra note 39
(describing districts' role as agents of reform).
172. McLaughlin & Talbert, supra note 170, at 178 (coining the term "reforming
districts").
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The contrast with the old layer-cake approach to educational
governance could not be more stark. For decades, education policy
rested on the principle that autonomous school districts would be the
primary implementor, and therefore shaper, of policy initiatives and a
virtually insurmountable obstacle to reforms that they disfavored.
Education policy generated elsewhere, within the courts and without,
had to accommodate the fact of district power, whether by
persuasion, co-optation, or hierarchical regulation-all tactics to
which, particularly with regard to reform efforts, recalcitrant districts
proved more than equal. In the changed, evolving constitutional
structure of education, district power instead is displaced in part and
what remains is transformed. In many ways, school districts have
become in fact the junior partners they always were in theory.173
The consequences of the structural rearrangement of educational
governance remain to be seen. For reformers, the hope is that
making district power contingent will compel them to become
"reforming districts," so that children need not rely on districts' freely
choosing that path. This seems a reasonable hope for the new
structures-although polyarchy, with its plenitude of institutions
striving against one another for their own ends, guarantees little
beyond complexity. But before making, in Part III, some
observations regarding how this complexity is likely to express itself
going forward, I turn to a different question: How did structural
change arise?
II. THE STATES ESCAPE THE ADEQUACY TRAP
The upheaval in educational governance described in Part I
resulted from neither progressive triumph nor random accident.
State governments did not carefully weigh policy alternatives or
conduct cost/benefit analyses to conclude analytically that the best
way to improve public education was to displace school districts from
their privileged position in the intergovernmental web. But neither
did states, and later the federal government, stumble at random into a
policy of eroding district power. Instead, I argue in this Part, among
the causes of the transformation of the school district were two legal
developments. The first, generated by liberals working through the
courts, was third-wave school-finance doctrine. The third-wave cases
hold that states have a constitutional duty to guarantee an adequate
public education to all children, a duty they cannot escape by
delegating it to school districts. The second development, founded in
173. See supra text accompanying notes 32-37.
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libertarian thinking, was legal advocacy for school choice. No one
advocating these positions sought the administrative rearrangement
that their ideas generated; indeed, third-wave proponents likely
would have opposed it and boosters of choice seen it largely as a
distraction. Nevertheless adequacy theory and choice advocacy
interacted in the crucible of state policymaking to produce significant,
if unintended, structural change.
A. Equity, Adequacy, and the Tactics of the Third Wave
The path to the disempowerment of school districts began with
school-finance plaintiffs rebuffed in their quest for equity and
searching for a new approach. The first and second wave failed to
secure dramatic increases in state aid to distressed school districts.7 4
The second wave overcame Rodriguez's rejection of the first:75 there
were,76 and there remain today,177 state courts prepared to hold that
inequitable school-finance arrangements violate state requirements of
equal protection. But, it turns out, second-wave victories were largely
pyrrhic. Notwithstanding early judicial victories, equality in school
finance proved an elusive and retreating target.
Genuine equality may be so overwhelmingly expensive to secure
that it is for practical purposes unrealizable. It is, after all, formalistic
in the extreme to think that equality of inputs-of funds-can fairly
be said to constitute true equality. 178 Distressed schools function in
environments more expensive than suburban schools, and, more
important, serve student populations much more difficult to teach. 79
Therefore many discussions of school finance note that equality
reasonably defined demands fiscal equality-plus, or vertical equity:
poor districts should be given greater per-student resources than rich
ones.180  The obvious rejoinder is "How much more?"-and while
there is no a priori answer, it seems very likely that much, much more
would be required. We have known since the Coleman report that a
174. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
175. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973).
176. See Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 374 (Conn. 1977); Bismark Pub. Sch. Dist. v.
State, 511 N.W.2d 247,259 (N.D. 1994).
177. See Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 390 (Vt. 1997).
178. See Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance
Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 149-52 (1995); David N. Figlio, Funding and
Accountability: Some Conceptual and Technical Issues in State Aid Reform, in HELPING
CHILDREN LEFr BEHIND, supra note 40, at 87, 88-89.
179. See Abbott v. Burke (Abbott 11), 575 A.2d 359, 377 (N.J. 1990).
180. See id. at 402-03; Ryan & Saunders, supra note 9, at 468-70 (citing, inter alia,
Underwood, supra note 8, at 495).
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much greater portion of the gap between rich and poor in academic
achievement is explained by differences in family circumstances than
by differences in schools; 8' this result suggests that many multiples of
what is spent on the schools of the wealthy would need to be spent on
poor schools in order to erase that gap. Certainly the dramatic
increases in inputs in recent years in districts like Newark, New Jersey
have not brought corresponding gains in academic achievement.'82
Indeed, it seems likely that even if states were to abolish school
districts183 and allociate school funding in proportion to student needs,
educational outcomes would still not be equalized so long as rich and
middle-class parents can otherwise compensate for the failings of
public schools by, for example, enriching their home environments,
providing extracurricular opportunities, and exercising their
constitutionally guaranteed right to choose private schooling. Even if
this were untrue, and all that were required for equality is that every
dollar spent by the rich be matched by twenty dollars, or even just ten
dollars, for the poor, the resulting budgets start to seem the stuff of
fantasy rather than realizable policy reform.
Indeed, in the American political economy even the more
modest goal of equality of inputs-spending as much on each poor
student as we spend on a rich student-is fantastic. In Professor
Laurie Reynolds's recent formulation, a "never-ending upward spiral
of spending by wealthy districts ... leaves state legislatures in a
permanent scramble to patch together funds for the poorer districts
for which the discretion to tax and spend is a meaningless catchall
phrase."'" 4  "Scramble" nicely suggests stopgap solutions and
181. JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE,
EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 290-325 (1966) (Sup. Doc. No. FS
5.238:38001); see also Selcuk R. Sirin, Socioeconomic Status and Academic Achievement:
A Meta-Analytic Review of Research, 75 REV. EDUC. RES. 417, 422, 438 (2005)
(metaanalysis of fifty-eight studies concluding that "parents' location in the socioeconomic
structure has a strong impact on students' academic achievement ... both by directly
providing resources at home and by indirectly providing the social capital that is necessary
to succeed in school").
182. Per-pupil spending in Newark increased from $5,713 in the 1992-93 school year to
$14,694 in 2000-2001; this 150 percent increase dwarfs the corresponding twenty-seven
percent increase in statewide spending per pupil, from $9,415 to $11,960. See Nat'l Ctr. for
Educ. Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Digest of Education Statistics tbls.90, 91, 164, 171,
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest (last visited Feb. 19, 2006). Similar data for other
locations is also available; for example, during the same period per-pupil spending in
Hartford rose fifty-four percent against thirty-two percent statewide. Id.
183. For the most carefully thought-out proposal along these lines, see KATHRYN A.
MCDERMOTt, CONTROLLING PUBLIC EDUCATION: LOCALISM VERSUS EQUITY 122-41
(1999).
184. Reynolds, supra note 40, at 817.
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temporary fixes poorly thought through, but the metaphor is inapt to
whatever extent it suggests legislative energy or enthusiasm.
Legislatures are structurally dominated by suburban interests that
fundamentally oppose both redirecting funds from richer to poorer
districts and capping the ability of the rich to finance their own
schools.'85 Legislatures are therefore constitutionally averse to the
sort of education reform second-wave doctrine requires. 86 When
determined courts have successfully extracted reforms from defiant
legislatures and balky governors, the new laws fall short of providing
genuine equality, and, just as important, are implemented in a
desultory and half-hearted fashion. As Reynolds notes, there appears
to be no way to equalize education spending without restricting the
ability of some school districts to raise education funds on their own
behalf via the property tax, because that capability is so vast in certain
property-rich school districts that it is beyond the capacity of many
other districts to match.187 Clever financial formulas designed to
mitigate this problem in ways relatively palatable to the suburbs have
proved unavailing. The only solution is the "Robin Hood" approach
of requiring the rich to share most of whatever additional dollars they
choose to raise with poor school districts.188 But Robin Hood plans
generate superheated political opposition,'8 9 and also, some argue,
reduce statewide political support for public education in general. 190
It is no surprise, then, that over time more courts came to view
judicial demands for fiscal equity as misguided. The second wave,
hailed as a breakthrough at its apogee, began to fade.19' Some courts
dismissed second-wave cases by holding that fiscal equity was a
nonjusticiable "political question," consigned to the exclusive
185. See, e.g., REED, supra note 43, at 128-29 (describing suburban opposition to
reductions in state aid to their districts and to interdistrict transfers of locally-raised tax
monies); Rebell, supra note 1, at 13 ("Legislatures tend to respond to entrenched interests,
and, increasingly, affluent suburban districts control the politics of educational funding.");
cf FISCHEL, supra note 44, at 120 (Section titled "Locals View the Property Tax Base as
Their Own").
186. See REED, supra note 43, at 135 ("[Tjhe geographic nature of property taxes ...
intersects with the geographic nature of state electoral representation, yielding a political
logic that can produce intense opposition to... the reform of school financing.").
187. See Reynolds, supra note 40, at 810.
188. See id. at 788-97, 811.
189. See, e.g., Yinger, supra note 40, at 22 ("explicitly restrict[ing] supplementation by
high-wealth districts [is] . .. often politically unpopular"); Maurice Dyson, The Death Of
Robin Hood? Proposals for Overhauling Public School Finance, 11 GEO. J. ON POVERTY
L. & POL'Y 1, 52 (2004) (predicting the effective termination of "Robin Hood"
redistribution in Texas).
190. See McUsic, supra note 51, at 112-14; Enrich, supra note 178, at 158, 161.
191. See BOSWORTH, supra note 1, at 36-37.
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jurisdiction of the elected branches. 92 Commentators continue to
debate the legal basis for such reasoning,'93 but the realpolitik that
recourse to political question doctrine reflects is spot-on. One way to
read claims of nonjusticiability is as embodying a judicial recognition
that the political forces massed behind the preservation of inequality
were more than a match for judicial power. Second-wave doctrine
truly forced elected officials to navigate between the Scylla of the
courts and the Charybdis of political support for the status quo. They
got eaten either way; and judges came to see their preprandial half-
measures less as Reynolds's scramble than as the flailing of the
drowned.
School-finance plaintiffs, confronted with judges unwilling to
embrace the equality holding of the second wave, reacted with
lawyerly 6lan. Their immediate goal, in both first- and second-wave
cases, had been to force states to cough up additional resources for
their poorest school districts. If a direct appeal to equality could not
generate that result, a more circuitous argument might.194 The shift
192. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156,168 (Ga. 1981) (stating that funding
disparities among school districts are an issue exclusively for legislature); Comm. for Educ.
Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1193 (Ill. 1996) ("[T]he question of whether the
educational institutions and services in Illinois are 'high quality' is outside the sphere of
the judicial function."); City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 54 (R.I. 1995) (finding
that the legislature holds constitutional power over the establishment and maintenance of
the school funding system); see also Larry J. Obhof, Rethinking Judicial Activism and
Restraint in State School Finance Litigation, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 569, 585-94
(2004) (analyzing differing reactions of state courts in regard to the judicial role in school
funding policy); Rebell, supra note 1, at 7 (noting that most courts deciding second-wave
cases "declined to issue remedial orders because of a core institutional concern-
expressed in a variety of specific doctrinal rationales such as 'judicial manageability,'
separation of powers, or the courts' inability to devise appropriate remedies for complex
social problems").
193. Compare Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of
Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1137 (1999) ("When a state
constitution creates a right to a government-provided social service, the relevant judicial
question should be whether a challenged law achieves, or is at least likely to achieve, the
constitutionally prescribed end," rather than "whether the law is within the bounds of
state legislative power."), with Michael Heise, Schoolhouses, Courthouses, and
Statehouses: Educational Finance, Constitutional Structure, and the Separation of Powers
Doctrine, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 281, 304 (1998) (arguing that state court
justiciability of school finance is a close question).
194. Molly McUsic explains:
[B]ecause a minimum standards claim does not demand that every school district
be made 'equal' to the wealthiest school district, a successful claim need result only
in boosted funding to substandard schools; it need not divert funds from richer
districts, overthrow the state financing system, or otherwise disrupt local control of
schools.
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from second to third wave was thus tactical rather than strategic.' 95
The third-wave claim-that states must ensure that all school districts
have the financial resources to educate all students adequately,
irrespective of interdistrict equality-was designed to offer judges a
different, more palatable, somewhat less ambitious, and more
judicially manageable justification for ordering the financial reforms
that plaintiffs had sought all along.196
To be sure, the limited ambitions of adequacy gave some pause.
A state could, for example, ensure that all districts are adequate and
still permit those of the rich to be superlative; such a policy passes
muster under the third, but not the second, wave. This possibility led
some commentators to bemoan the third wave as an ideological
retreat to a position tolerant of inequality.197 But most observers
recognized that, given the desperate state of most suffering school
districts, worrying that adequate schools might remain unequal was a
mostly theoretical exercise. If courts unwilling to force money from
the legislature in the name of equality could be convinced to do so in
the name of adequacy, then that seemed a promising way forward.198
Moreover, as adequacy cases moved through the courts, it
became clear that adequacy is a fuzzy concept not at all distinct from
equality. What level of knowledge of mathematics or history is
adequate, after all, is not an objective question. One natural place to
look for criteria is to the curricula and performance levels of good
schools, and to the aspirations for all schools set out by the
Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform Litigation, 28
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 310 (1991); see also Enrich, supra note 178, at 173 (arguing that,
while third-wave "strategy may not suffice to ensure levels of state financial commitment
commensurate to the needs of poorer districts or the hopes of litigants, it may often suffice
to support a finding that an existing state system for financing education is
impermissible").
195. Although some commentators describe the shift from equity to adequacy claims as
"strategic," see, e.g., ELAINE M. WALKER, EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY AND THE COURTS
25 (2005) (noting that "litigants strategically shifted their focus from emphasizing equity
and fiscal neutrality to emphasizing equity"); Rebell, supra note 1, at 7 (discussing the
"strategic advantage ... emphasized by the wave theorists"), this is a pure difference of
usage and does not imply disagreement with the claim here that it was "tactical." I think
Walker and especially Rebell would agree that second- and third-wave plaintiffs shared
common strategic goals.
196. See Enrich, supra note 178, at 166-70. But cf. Coalition for Adequacy & Fairness
in Sch. Funding v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400, 408 (Fla. 1996) (refusing to adjudicate school
finance because of risk of judicial usurpation of legislative power, although plaintiffs
presented an argument based upon "adequacy").
197. See, e.g., Enrich, supra note 178, at 181 ("I remain troubled by ... the question of
whether aiming at adequacy is simply aiming too low.").
198. See id. at 166-70.
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legislature.199 Thus adequacytakes on a comparative element.2"' This
element is intensified by the commonly made argument that a
primary goal of education is to prepare students for a competitive job
market.01 Students from poor districts cannot compete adequately
with students from elsewhere unless the two groups are roughly
similarly situated. Adequacy thus defined incorporates an equalizing
ratchet. Were enough communities to fund local schools to be
"superlative," as suggested above, the superlative standards they
adopt might come to be accepted by the courts as a revised
benchmark for adequacy. In these ways comparative definitions of
adequacy permit equality to reassert itself.20 2 Thus equality language
often stubbornly reappears even in judicial opinions that ostensibly
reject equality arguments in favor of narrower adequacy standards.2 3
Third-wave litigation brought plaintiffs many victories. Courts
that had declined to endorse full-throated equality endorsed
adequacy.2 °  "Each child, every child, in this Commonwealth must be
provided with an equal opportunity to have an adequate education,"
wrote the Kentucky Supreme Court in the leading third-wave case.205
Third-wave courts also repeatedly emphasized that to educate all
students adequately was a duty incumbent upon the state, imposed by
the state constitution. States were entitled to discharge this duty by
creating a system of local school districts only if those local districts in
199. See James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, The Federal No Child Left Behind Act
and the Post-Desegregation Civil Rights Agenda, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1703, 1720 (2003).
200. See REED, supra note 43, at 128; Avidan Y. Cover, Note, Is "Adequacy" a More
"Political Question" than "Equality?". The Effect of Standards-Based Education on
Judicial Standards for Education Finance, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 403, 405 (2002)
("[E]quality concerns inform the adequacy argument.").
201. See, e.g., Ala. Coal. for Equity v. Hunt, 624 So.2d 107, 137 (Ala. 1993) (basing a
finding of inadequacy in part upon evidence of poor preparation of students for the
workforce); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 330 (N.Y. 2003)
(concluding that the state constitutional standard of educational adequacy includes "some
preparation for employment"); Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 347, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255
(1997) (concluding that the state constitutional standard of educational adequacy requires
schools to provide students "sufficient academic and vocational skills to enable the student
to compete on an equal basis with others in ... gainful employment in contemporary
society"); HOCHSCHILD & SCOVRONICK, supra note 13, at 17 (noting that preparation for
employment is a primary goal of public schooling).
202. See Underwood, supra note 8, at 518.
203. See Ryan & Saunders, supra note 9, at 467; Saiger, supra note 10, at 1710.
204. See Rebell, supra note 8, at 297 (noting "extraordinary" reversal of state supreme
courts from rejecting second-wave theories to endorsing third-wave ones). Rebell argues
provocatively that a classical liberal opposition to equality of results helped doom the
second wave, but that the same impulse later combined with republican ideology to favor
adequacy plaintiffs. See Rebell, supra note 1, at 10.
205. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 211 (Ky. 1989).
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fact generated the adequacy the state constitution requires; localism
would not exempt states from responsibility should school districts
fail. "[B]oth the Board of Education and the City" of New York,
wrote the Court of Appeals of New York, "are 'creatures or agents of
the State,' which delegated whatever authority over education they
wield. Thus, the State remains responsible when the failures of its
agents sabotage the measures by which it secures for its citizens their
constitutionally-mandated rights. 20 6  Advocates had reason to
celebrate such rhetoric, which appeared to compel substantial state
aid to districts that could not raise sufficient funds on their own-
especially as it became clear that the third wave would not entirely
displace equity arguments.
Initially the third-wave cases also appeared to reconfigure state
politics in a mold more friendly to poor districts. State court judges
accepted plaintiffs' suggestion that adequacy is jurisprudentially
different from equality, depending on different constitutional text and
making different demands on elected officials. 27  Now that state
courts were demanding "only" adequacy, rather than full-blown
equality, judges expected some matching flexibility on the part of
state elected officials and became less tolerant of legislative
resistance. Nor should the difficulty of politically justifying
inadequacy be discounted. While it is possible to endorse interdistrict
inequalities with a straight face, citing the tradition and values of
educational localism, it is much harder to defend a policy of
maintaining inadequate schools in impoverished communities. 08
The problem, however, was that the third wave was purely
tactical rather than strategic. The goal of the third wave was no
different from that of the second: to secure substantial new public
resources for poor schools. The third wave worked no change on the
opposition to that goal from legislatures, executives, or their
suburban constituencies. Especially as it became clear that adequacy
and equality were related, the foundational suburban preference for
spending education money locally resisted the third wave as it had the
second. Therefore, with the ascendancy of third-wave doctrine, state
defendants began to search for their own tactical innovations. Just as
206. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 801 N.E.2d at 343; accord DeRolph v. State, 677
N.E.2d 733, 746 (Ohio 1997) ("Our state Constitution makes the state responsible for
educating our youth. Thus, the state should not shirk its obligation by espousing cliches
about 'local control.' ").
207. See Rebell, supra note 8, at 297, 300-01.
208. Cf. Dyson, supra note 41, at 625-27 (discussing the importance to school reform
outcomes of articulating politically attractive norms).
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plaintiffs adopted third-wave tactics in order to accommodate judicial
regard for the constraints of state electoral politics with their own
policy goals, so too would state officials respond to the success of the
third wave with tactical moves that would preserve their primary
policy goal, the satisfaction of suburban education constituencies.
B. Blaming Inadequacy on Inadequate Agents: The Rhetoric of
Choice
States found their tactical solution in the school-choice rhetoric
that was becoming more audible just as third-wave plaintiffs began to
see victories in state courts of last resort.2 °9 Milton Friedman had
much earlier described a market mechanism to displace state
provision of primary and secondary education. If parents could direct
a state-issued voucher to any private school of their choice, Friedman
proposed, the market would generate a wide variety of schools,
untrammeled consumer sovereignty would increase overall citizen
satisfaction, and government-run schools would be disciplined by
parent preferences.210 It was in 1990, however, that a prominent
reformulation of Friedman's ideas offered choice as the singular
solution to what its authors identified as the pathologies of public
schooling. In Politics, Markets, and America's Schools, John Chubb
and Terry Moe made a splash by arguing that public schools were
doomed by their publicness: they were of low quality because they
were democratically governed.211 Chubb and Moe argued that while
market-based schools naturally focus on what parents demand-
schools that teach effectively and run well-government-run schools
just as naturally accede to the claims of organized interest groups and
metastasizing bureaucracies.212 Choice thus offers not a method for
disciplining government excess so much as an end-run-the only end-
run-around its pathologies. "The way to get schools with effective
209. See Michael Heise, Equal Educational Opportunity and Constitutional Theory:
Preliminary Thoughts on the Role of School Choice and the Autonomy Principle, 14 J.L. &
POL. 411, 413 (1998) (noting that interest in school choice exploded in the 1990s).
210. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 91-93 (1962); Milton
Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, in ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 123, 127 (Robert A. Solo ed., 1955); see also James Forman, Jr., The Secret
History of School Choice: How Progressives Got There First, 93 GEO. L.J. 1287, 1309-12
(2005) (describing school choice plans proposed by Christopher Jencks and other
"[p]rogressive voucher proponents" in the 1960s).
211. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 135, at 188-90 ("America's traditional institutions of
democratic control ... inherently breed bureaucracy and undermine autonomy. This is
not something that is temporary or the product of mistakes. It is deeply anchored in the
most fundamental properties of the system.").
212. Id. at 189-90.
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organizations is not to insist that democratic institutions should do
what they are incapable of doing," but to replace the institutions of
government with those of the marketplace. 13
Elected state officials do not offer a natural constituency for such
government-bashing. But one prominent element of Chubb and
Moe's argument was tailor-made for states facing school-finance
plaintiffs: that schools' failures were due primarily to how they were
run. One need not accept Chubb and Moe's implication that most
schools suffer from being established and managed by bureaucrats
rather than entrepreneurs to claim that the failings of deficient public
schools are properly attributed to substandard governance rather
than a dearth of resources.214 This argument met states' tactical
requirements: it preserves the status quo of suburban public schools,
which largely satisfy their constituencies, while shifting the onus for
unsatisfactory public schools from an external source-states that
deny them sufficient funding-to the internal problem of local
governance and management. It also resonated with trends in other
areas of state public administration, whereby states sought to regulate
loosely coupled, local bureaucrats by holding them accountable for
achieving high standards rather than simply regulating their
methods-in short, by insisting that the state's local agents be
competent.215
213. Id. at 191.
214. See Larry Cuban & Michael Usdan, Learning from the Past, in POWERFUL
REFORMS WITH SHALLOW ROOTS: IMPROVING AMERICA'S URBAN SCHOOLS 1, 6 (Larry
Cuban & Michael Usdan eds., 2003) [hereinafter POWERFUL REFORMS] ("[N]ational and
state reformers argued that what urban districts needed was not more money or more staff
but what all districts needed: a good dose of better governance and efficient management
215. This has long been the paradigm for state oversight of the financial administration
of general municipal governments, to which states generally permit self-management until
bankruptcy or other distress requires states to step in. See BERMAN, supra note 34, at
114-20. The approach is also visible in those administrative arenas where states have a
strong interest in the effectiveness of a service that nevertheless requires substantial local
discretion to be effective. Two good examples are welfare and policing. See, e.g., id. at 31
(giving examples of states where legislatures "set basic policies regarding [welfare]
eligibility and benefits ... but give counties considerable discretion in designing plans to
meet federal work requirements"); Barbara L. Bezdek, Contractual Welfare: Non-
Accountability and Diminished Democracy in Local Government Contracts for Welfare-to-
Work Services, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1559, 1607 (2001) (describing "double-devolution"
programs in which states conduct outcome-based monitoring of local welfare reform
efforts); William Bratton, Great Expectations, in MEASURING WHAT MATFERS 11, 11
(1999) (arguing that community policing programs that set demanding goals for local
police departments can generate "ambitious results"); Mark H. Moore & Margaret
Poethig, The Police as an Agency of Municipal Government: Implications for Measuring
Police Effectiveness, in MEASURING WHAT MATTERS, supra, at 151, 151-52 (identifying
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It is important to be clear that this move is distinct from a
wholesale embrace of school choice, which as noted above, has had
considerable but far from overwhelming success in displacing existing
policies. States did not become school-choice advocates.216 Rather,
the intellectual apparatus that choice advocates erected offered states
a plausible and targeted way to respond to educational inadequacy
that did not involve new funding: they could identify the root cause
of educational failure as poor institutional design rather than stingy
budgeting.217 Interest in choice, moreover, helped generate solid, if
not uncontroversial, economics and political science that justified a
focus on reforming educational institutional arrangements rather than
multiplying grants in aid. Choice proposals have galvanized a hotly
disputed econometric literature that investigates the relationship
between school expenditure and education achievement. Some
economists insist that one cannot consistently demonstrate a
significant, positive correlation between the two, and even those
passionately convinced of the converse agree that efficient
management and proper incentives are necessary for the correlation
to hold.218 And political scientists argue persuasively that the unique
circumstances of poor, urban school districts lead them to be
governed as "cartel[s]" or "employment regime[s]" that privilege the
economic role of schools as providers of jobs, resources, and
patronage over the educational mission generally emphasized in the
suburbs.2 19 A state can therefore hold itself out as responsive to third-
society's goals for policing as complex and demanding, and noting the need for outcome
measures that reflect that complexity).
Charles Sabel, working with several colleagues, has explicitly identified public
education as one of several areas of public administration that comprise a trend he calls
"democratic experimentalism," a "pragmatist" approach to local government based upon
"learning-by-monitorin[g], benchmarking, simultaneous engineering, and error detection."
Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 314 (1998); see also id. at 318 (identifying aspects of current
educational practice as experimentalist); Liebman & Sabel, supra note 12, at 184
(identifying New Accountability with the experimentalist paradigm, and analyzing it in
detail); cf Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARv. L.- REV. 1015, 1025-28 (2004) (identifying judicial
remedies in school-finance cases as experimentalist in character).
216. See infra notes 324-27 and accompanying text.
217. See Saiger, supra note 10, at 1694.
218. See TIMOTHY A. HACSI, CHILDREN AS PAWNS: THE POLITICS OF
EDUCATIONAL REFORM 188-94 (2002) (reviewing economists' debates); Ryan, supra
note 8, at 268-70 (same).
219. See WILBUR C. RICH, BLACK MAYORS AND SCHOOL POLITICS: THE FAILURE
OF REFORM IN DETROIT, GARY, AND NEWARK 5, 207-08 (1996); Clarence N. Stone,
Urban Education in Political Context, in CHANGING URBAN EDUCATION 1, 8-9 (Clarence
N. Stone ed., 1998); Saiger, supra note 10, at 1667 n.38 (collecting these and other studies).
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wave requirements not by supplementing inadequate district budgets
but by reforming inadequate district governments. And to the extent
that inadequate governance is (to use Chubb and Moe's words)
"anchored in the most fundamental properties" of distressed district
governments2°--a possibility that the work like that of Professors
Clarence Stone and Wilbur Rich strongly suggests221-a state properly
responds by replacing those districts with a different kind of
institution not susceptible to the same problematic incentives.
Such a response, moreover, fits like a key into the lock of third-
wave doctrine. One proposition repeatedly emphasized by those
courts that have adopted the third-wave theory is that a state, by
delegating the provision of education to school districts, does not
relieve itself of its own duty to educate all children adequately.
222
Absent such a claim, courts could not order states to supplement the
budgets of districts unable to fund education adequately on their own.
But if one's agent is not successfully deploying the resources it is
given, then it is just as reasonable-arguably even more reasonable-
to crack down on that agent before sending the existing agent more
money.223 One might reduce the agent's power, or supervise the agent
more aggressively, or replace the agent with a different sort of agent
with different sorts of incentives. These options are essentially the
policy changes described in Part I. Thus the third-wave theory,
helped along by the school choice movement, made an important
contribution to the decline of district governance and the rise of
education polyarchy.
This is not to claim direct causation between the third-wave cases
and the structural shift in educational governance; rather it is to assert
that the cases had a particular kind of influence. Given the complex
"ecology of games" that characterizes education politics,2 24 causation
is never simple. As I note above, in some respects the erosion of
district primacy was part of a broader trend.225 It is certainly unlikely
that the sudden spike in presidential, gubernatorial, and state
legislative interest in school accountability in the 1990s226 can be
220. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 135, at 189-90.
221. See supra note 219.
222. See supra text accompanying note 206.
223. See Saiger, supra note 10, at 1694-95.
224. See William A. Firestone, Education Policy as an Ecology of Games, 18 EDUC.
RESEARCHER 18, 18 (1989); Marilyn Gittell, School Reform in New York and Chicago:
Revisiting the Ecology of Local Games, 30 URB. AFF. Q. 136, 136 (1994); Saiger, supra
note 10, at 1687 & nn.130-31.
225. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
226. See Saiger, supra note 10, at 1656.
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explained in its totality by the third-wave cases. But those cases did
pose a serious and pressing problem for state elected officials, and the
doctrine the cases announced shaped political and policy responses.
The victories won by school-finance plaintiffs in the 1990s were more
than "disentrenching."227  They did not simply put governors and
legislators on notice that they had to abandon their policy of
complacency about failing schools and do something.228 Rather, the
precise doctrinal content of the third-wave cases importantly shaped
the particular policy states chose to adopt. However anxious (or
recalcitrant) legislators and governors were to do good by urban
schools, they were also anxious to placate courts that were clearly
willing to impose very unattractive remedies under a third-wave
theory. They undertook the particular reforms they did in no small
part because those reforms were genuinely responsive to the third-
wave rule that states had to take direct responsibility for urban
education and could not hide behind district failure.
Observers on the ground in particular states have taken note of
this dynamic. A student describing the adoption of the pathmaking
New Jersey law authorizing the state to take over poorly performing
school districts understood it to be an "innovative attempt to ...
fulfil[l] [judicial] mandate[s]. 229 Supporters of a similar takeover bill
in New Hampshire argued that their proposal was "crucial to carrying
out the [state] Supreme Court edict that all children have access to an
adequate education. '23 °  In Connecticut the state takeover of
Hartford's schools was similarly understood to be a straightforward
attempt to respond to the Connecticut Supreme Court's controversial
Sheff v. O'NeillTM decision that required the amelioration of racial
isolation in that state's urban schools.232 In the 2002 Virginia
governor's race, the Republican candidate countered his opponent's
plan to enhance education-finance equity through additional state
227. Liebman & Sabel, supra note 12, at 191-92; see also BOSWORTH, supra note 1, at
43 (collecting scholarship articulating a disentrenchment theory).
228. See BOSWORTH, supra note 1, at 207-16.
229. F. Clinton Broden, Note, Litigating State Constitutional Rights to an Adequate
Education and the Remedy of State Operated School Districts, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 779,
781 (1990).
230. Clare Kittredge, Fears Hamper Effort to Set School Standards, BOSTON GLOBE,
Mar. 19, 2000, at N.H. Weekly 1.
231. 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996).
232. See HOCHSCHILD & SCOVRONICK, supra note 13, at 46-47; Jeff Archer, Hartford
Seeks State Help in Running Schools, EDUC. WK., Mar. 19, 1997, at 3.
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spending with a proposal that his state take over failing local
schools.233
A thicker account of the relationship between adequacy suits and
state-sponsored governance reform comes from Cleveland, Ohio. In
1991, several Ohio school districts (not including Cleveland's) filed a
third-wave challenge to the state's school-finance system, ultimately
styled DeRolph v. State.234 By the mid-1990s it was clear that the case
would be both momentous and hotly contested. In 1994, the trial
court applied an adequacy theory, held Ohio's entire school-finance
scheme to be unconstitutional, and decreed institutional reform.235
The trial court required "the State Board of Education to prepare
legislative proposals for submission to the General Assembly to
eliminate wealth-based disparities among Ohio's public school
districts," and "retained jurisdiction in the matter only for a period of
time to ensure that the order was followed and that appropriate steps
were taken to institute a totally new system of school funding. 2 36 A
divided state intermediate court, however, then reversed, 237 and the
case headed to the Ohio Supreme Court.
Before that court could issue a decision, however, another line of
litigation came to a head involving a challenge in federal court to the
Cleveland school district's compliance with longstanding
desegregation consent decrees. In 1995, a federal district court that
had retained jurisdiction over the desegregation case declared a
"crisis of magnitude" involving the district's "total ... collapse," and
took the very unusual step of placing the entire Cleveland school
district under direct state control.238  The remedy is notable as a
judicial departure from the district-centered paradigm;2 39 but of
greater interest here is the response of the State of Ohio, aware that
its finance system was at risk of being declared illegal and confronted
with sudden authority over the Cleveland system. The state fairly
quickly passed two very significant governance reforms affecting the
district.2 °  The first was its now-famous voucher program, under
233. Editorial, Good Sense, Mostly, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Dec. 15, 2002, at
E2, available at 2002 WLNR 1452039.
234. 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997).
235. Id. at 734-35.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Reed v. Rhodes, 934 F. Supp. 1459, 1468, 1473 (N.D. Ohio 1996).
239. See Saiger, supra note 10, at 1715 n.232.
240. Both during the litigation of DeRolph and after the Ohio Supreme Court's
decision, Ohio's governor and legislators "focused not only on complying with DeRolf
[sic], but also towards solving various non-monetary problems as well." Larry J. Obhof,
DeRolph v. State and Ohio's Long Road to an Adequate Education, 2005 B.Y.U. EDUC. &
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which Cleveland public school students could receive a publicly
funded education at participating private schools within city limits.
2 41
The second was to institute mayoral control of Cleveland's schools. 42
Vouchers and mayoral control share several characteristics.
First, notwithstanding the looming DeRolph litigation, neither
involved new school funding for Cleveland: both were revenue-
neutral reforms that targeted governance exclusively.
Second, both reformed governance through unapologetic
attempts to undermine the existing institution of local control in the
district, i.e., the school board. The Cleveland voucher program was
explicitly designed to offer an alternative to the board,243 each
voucher student representing a loss to the public school budget. In
any city, assignment of control to the mayor similarly constitutes a
direct attack upon the existing institution of the school district; a
fortiori in Cleveland, where district leaders and the mayor had been
publicly feuding.2"
Finally, the governance reforms were fully consistent with the
maintenance of suburban prerogatives. In this respect the
legislature's reforms could not have less resembled the statewide
remedies sought by the DeRolph plaintiffs.245 Neither the voucher
L.J. 83, 113; see also id. at 139 (cataloguing non-fiscal reforms and arguing that by 2002
Ohio's legislature and bureaucracy "had made efforts to comply with the Ohio Supreme
Court's holdings, but had long since shifted its primary focus to such things as
accountability, early educational attainment, and stronger curricula"). Obhof's
implication that "non-monetary" reforms are orthogonal to compliance with DeRolph, see
id. at 113, 139, seems misplaced.
241. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 644 (2002) (noting that the voucher
program was enacted "against th[e] backdrop" of the educational crisis condemned in
Reed); id. at 647 (noting vouchers enacted "in response to the 1995 takeover").
242. See Mixon v. Ohio, 1999 FED App. 0347P, 5, 193 F.3d 389, 395 (6th Cir. 1999)
(quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3311.71-.77 (1998)); cf Rich & Chambers, supra note
137, at 171-73 (recounting the history of mayoral involvement in the Cleveland schools
leading to the passage of Ohio House Bill 269 "granting the mayor control of the
schools").
243. Justice Thomas describes it:
Faced with a severe educational crisis, the State of Ohio enacted wide-ranging
educational reform that allows voluntary participation of private and religious
schools in educating poor urban children otherwise condemned to failing public
schools. The program ... simply gives parents a greater choice as to where and in
what manner to educate their children. This is a choice that those with greater
means have routinely exercised.
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 680 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also id. at 647 (stating that the
voucher "program is part of a broader undertaking by the State to enhance the
educational options of Cleveland's schoolchildren").
244. See Mixon, 193 F.3d at 394.
245. See DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 747 (Ohio 1997).
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nor the mayoral control legislation246 were to have application outside
of urban Cleveland.247 In particular, the voucher program's gesture to
extra-urban participation was not just nominal but cynically so:
although the legislation could have required school districts adjacent
to Cleveland's to accept Cleveland residents as voucher pupils, it
instead merely invites them to do so.248 As the legislature knew full
well, the likelihood that a suburban district would voluntarily import
urban voucher students was utterly remote. 49
With DeRolph looming,250 a state legislature forced to act thus
looked immediately not to fiscal support but to quite dramatic
governance reforms-vouchers and mayoral control-that
nevertheless could be easily restricted to particular districts. Such
reforms are simply much more attractive to states than the systemic
reforms that third-wave plaintiffs seek.
In another example, Baltimore, takeover and school-finance
politics were connected even more explicitly. Maryland had initially
responded to a third-wave suit brought by Baltimore and private
plaintiffs by arguing "that pervasive mismanagement in Baltimore,
rather than a lack of resources, was responsible for the deficiencies of
246. Mayoral control did formally affect areas outside of Cleveland proper because the
Cleveland school district included some urbanized areas outside of, but adjacent to, city
limits. Thus public schools in these areas would be controlled by a mayor for whom their
residents could not vote. See Mixon, 193 F.3d at 395, 403-06 (describing and upholding
the limited "extraterritoriality" involved).
247. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 644-45 (discussing vouchers made available to parents
only in districts "'under federal court order requiring supervision and operational
management of the district by the state superintendent'" (quoting OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3313.975(A))); Mixon, 193 F.3d at 395 (noting that mayor is to take control over
school boards only in " 'a school district that is or has ever been under a federal court
order requiring supervision and operational, fiscal, and personnel management of the
district by the state superintendent of public instruction'" (quoting OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3311.71(A)(1))). These elaborate but precise ways of saying "Cleveland" are
formalisms designed to comply with Ohio's no-special-legislation requirement. See id. at
408-09.
248. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 645 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.976(C)).
249. See id. at 707 & n.17 (Souter, J., dissenting).
250. Wilbur Rich and Stefanie Chambers, in their thorough account of Cleveland
school politics during this period, have little to say about DeRolph beyond noting its
holding. See Rich & Chambers, supra note 137, at 181. Much more significant to their
account are local fiscal distress and the local electoral politics of school bond issues. See
id. at 170-71, 180-82. This emphasis may explain the contrast between Rich and
Chambers's sophistication in accounting for local political behavior and their apparent
puzzlement regarding the roots of state support for mayoral control. See id. at 172
("Interestingly, the Republican-dominated state legislature was quite willing to hand over
control of the schools over to the Democratic mayor.").
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the City school system. '25 1 Baltimore's mayor and Maryland state
officials then engineered a "trade" in which the state would provide
new resources, the mayor would take responsibility for the system in
place of the existing school board, and the city would drop its pending
school-finance suit.25 2 The so-called Baltimore "cohabitation" bill, in
which the state and mayor agreed to share power over the schools,
was eventually passed under the shadow of the expectation that,
absent an agreement, the state would displace local power and begin
to reform schools directly pursuant to school-finance doctrine. 3
[T]he decision to focus on mismanagement ... signaled that the
State cared about the Baltimore schools and was not simply
being obstructionist by denying its constitutional duty
altogether. Indeed, it allowed the state to portray itself as
acting in the best interest of the school children in Baltimore by
insisting that any infusion of resources be well spent.254
A similar trade was made in Philadelphia, where a 2000 takeover
threat was averted in part by the city's promise to drop a federal
lawsuit claiming that the state's school-finance formulae
discriminated against minorities.255
An increase in state aggressiveness and district vulnerability is
not necessarily an undesirable result of adequacy litigation, but it is
surely an ironic one, both for third-wave plaintiffs and proponents of
school choice. The goal of third-wave suits, as of second-wave suits
before them, was to strengthen local districts by procuring additional
financial support from the state. But the unavoidable emphasis of the
third-wave courts upon states' nondelegable duties appears to have
weakened distressed districts instead, making them less powerful and
more dependent. Thus the gulf between urban districts and their
suburban counterparts is magnified: already far apart in the nature of
their student populations, their resources, and the quality of the
251. Thomas Saunders, Settling Without "Settling": School Finance Litigation and
Governance Reform in Maryland, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 571, 581 (2004).
252. Jessica Portner, State Takeover of Baltimore Schools Mulled, EDUC. WK., Jan. 31,
1996, at 1; see also James G. Cibulka, The City-State Partnership to Reform Baltimore's
Public Schools, in POWERFUL REFORMS, supra note 214, at 125, 125 (determining that
what Baltimore's Mayor "reluctantly settled for in the partnership was a Faustian bargain
in which he gave up mayoral authority and historic autonomy of the city's public schools
from state intrusion, in exchange for more money to support the cash-strapped system").
253. See William F. Zorzi, Jr., A Statesman Rises to the Occasion, BALT. SUN, Apr. 15,
1997, at 2C.
254. Saunders, supra note 251, at 583.
255. See Robert C. Johnson, Settlement Averts School Shutdown in Philadelphia,
EDUC. WK., June 7,2000, at 3.
[Vol. 84
THE LAST WAVE
education they deliver, rich and poor districts are further
distinguished by a differential lack of local autonomy in educational
decisionmaking. This is precisely the opposite of what third-wave
plaintiffs were seeking.
Nor did the school choice movement mean to provide either
inspiration or an empirical basis for states to destabilize the layer-
cake format of educational governance in favor of more powerful
state agencies and a more fractured distribution of local power. Their
goal had been to break the connection between government
management and schools, not to remake it. But their argument that
governance was a key variable in school performance, and the
empirical exploration of that idea by economists and political
scientists,256 seem in retrospect naturally to have spurred the
rearrangement of government power rather than its reduction. Once
states had embraced that rearrangement, moreover, it was perhaps
not unexpected that an administration in Washington ideologically
allied with voucher proponents would ultimately embrace a federal
education reform law whose central theme was to limit district
discretion, even as it accepted a role for vouchers per se that was
quite marginal. 57
Going into the third wave, then, nobody intended to reconfigure
educational governance on a polyarchic model. Rather, polyarchy
emerged from education's ecology of games, spurred by the details of
third-wave doctrine and ideas about the nature of the educational
marketplace. That the emergence of polyarchy was unplanned,
however, does not mean that it was not serendipitous. It may well be
true that the problems of distressed schools are due primarily not to
states' stinginess with aid, and not to immutable features of
democratic governance per se, but to the particular shape of
governing institutions in urban school districts. School district
autonomy may well be an obstacle to effective school reform, and
education polyarchy a good strategy for improving reform's chances.
As a hypothesis about school reform, this seems plausible but far
from established. Nevertheless, it is the path that the system has
taken: regardless whether it ultimately proves beneficial, education
polyarchy-the proximate result of the third wave-will determine
the potentials and constraints of the next generation of urban school
reform.
256. See supra notes 218-21 and accompanying text.
257. See No Child Left Behind Act, 20 U.S.C. § 6316(c)(10)(C)(vii) (Supp. II 2002).
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III. A REVISED ECOLOGY FOR SCHOOL REFORM
To this point I have argued that various interests pursued
strategies that interacted in the educational "ecology of games" to
produce a momentous result that none anticipated. Education-
finance plaintiffs wanted to force states to provide additional
resources to distressed school districts; courts sought to accede to that
request in ways consistent with judicial power, judicial competence,
and respect for coordinate branches of state government; and choice
advocates hoped to supplant governments with markets. States
searched for a response that could maintain suburban educational
advantage, mollify state court judges, and not bust their budgets. The
result was a new view of the proper constitutional structure of
education, one that cabined school districts' once capacious power
and transformed their role from that of an entitled monopolist to that
of a constrained and contingent manager.
This structural change cannot but in turn affect future school
reform efforts. Just as states restructured school governance in
response to third-wave doctrine and choice advocacy, various
interests will seek to advance their goals within the altered structure
of educational governance. This Part identifies some of the ways that
structural changes will shape various interests' strategies and tactics in
order to shed some light upon the possible directions that school
reform will take in these new circumstances.
A. Pressure on Employment Regimes
The new approach to educational governance has, especially in
distressed, underperforming school districts, greatly reduced the
power and autonomy once enjoyed by the urban, educational
employment regime."'
This has been accomplished largely by methods other than
traditional, top-down rulemaking. Cognizant of districts'
implementation power, many of the new directives instead require
districts to meet various outcome requirements. Thus many state
New Accountability programs require districts to reach or exceed
minimal rates of attendance, test passage, and graduation.2 19 The
NCLB, with its Washington-designed definitions of average yearly
progress in terms of standardized test passage rates, is the apotheosis
of this trend: it sets out detailed criteria for success, and the
consequences that will follow upon failure, without mandating that a
258. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
259. See Saiger, supra note 10, at 1674-75.
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particular curriculum or student-placement process be followed. 6 °
Scholars of regulatory design have expressed the hope that various
features of this outcome-based approach make it a more promising
strategy for inducing improved school district performance than
classical command-and-control regulation.261 It is also clear that it is,
and will, remain difficult for regulatory authorities consistently to
resist regulating inputs along with outcomes;262 the tension is
particularly vivid in the context of NCLB, where some requirements
are purely outcome-based and agnostic as to methods, while others,
like the requirement that all instruction be provided by "qualified"
teachers, regulate inputs and process quite exactingly.263
The question of the effectiveness of regulatory strategies is vital
for reformers; but, from the point of view of districts, the simple fact
of outcome regulation is the critical development. Districts now must
do many things that were previously de facto optional. Under the old
layer-cake approach an urban school district could afford to take a
lackadaisical approach to the quality of mathematics and reading
instruction; although this likely violated numerous top-down
directives, low quality brought no untoward consequence to the
district itself and was, for students and their parents, just a fact of life.
Under accountability rules that emphasize math and reading test
scores and impose sanctions of consequence to the regime for failure,
that district now must focus on instructional quality. Of course, this
external, regulatory reorganization of a district's priorities can do
more than shake the district out of its inexcusable, if fully explicable,
inertia; regulators' preferences have also, according to critics, led
districts to overregiment and bureaucratize instruction264 and to
260. See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 199, at 1723; Andrea K. Rorrer, Intersections in
Accountability Reform, in EDUCATIONAL EQUITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY: PARADIGMS,
POLICIES, AND POLITICS 251, 253 (Linda Skrla & James Joseph Scheurich eds., 2004)
("Although NCLB seemingly has provisions for states to retain their individualism and
authority, the specific requirements stipulated for state standards, assessments, and
accountability systems throughout the United States are likely to induce more similarity
between state policies over the next 3-5 years.").
261. See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 12, at 191-92 (proposing that New
Accountability programs show promise because they incorporate methods for feedback,
benchmarking, and institutional learning); Saiger, supra note 10, at 1705-06 (proposing
that New Accountability programs show promise because they combine vague
implementation standards with sanctions that create effective incentives).
262. See Ryan, supra note 93, at 985-86 (arguing that NCLB's regulatory regime is
likely unstable).
263. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
264. See Mary Bushnell, Teachers in the Schoolhouse Panopticon, 35 EDUC. & URB.
Soc'Y. 251, 259-61 (2003).
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shortchange nonregulated priorities, like recess and the arts.265 These
are two sides of the same regulatory coin.
The market-based regulatory strategy of charters and other
schools of choice have a similar dynamic. Regardless whether
market-based institutions catalyze more effective school reform than
intergovernmental regulation, both strategies genuinely constrain
school districts. Just as districts must privilege core-subject
instruction once the state or federal government decides to sanction
them for failure, they must privilege whatever activities are necessary
to keep too many parents from defecting to their competition.
All this regulation-whether intergovernmental or market, state
or federal, input- or outcome-focused-significantly constrains the
ability of employment interests to pursue their own goals. To be sure,
they are not without resources; teachers' unions, in particular, have
the geographical scope and institutional capacity to organize
effectively at the state as well as the local level. Nevertheless, while in
many distressed local districts employment interests essentially were
the regime, in state politics they must compete with other claimants.
With state control the regime no longer has the luxury to pursue
employment interests unfettered. In order to continue to serve those
interests, it must please newly aggressive regulators and newly
empowered parent-consumers.
One major component of the transformation of the school
district cannot be described as regulatory: mayoral control.
Nevertheless mayoral administration presents urban employment
regimes with challenges even more serious than those posed by
regulation. Indeed, because mayoral control substitutes as the
authority over schooling an institution just as local as school boards
but dramatically less susceptible to capture by employment interests,
it is a frontal attack upon the authority of such regimes.266
Mayors are different from school boards. They are politically
accountable where boards are not.267 Unlike school districts, mayors
offer a single, visible address for voters' pleasure or discontent; New
265. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
266. Kenneth J. Meier, Structure, Politics, and Policy: The Logic of Mayoral Control,
in MAYORS IN THE MIDDLE, supra note 136, at 221.
267. See Michael Kirst & Katrina Bulkley, "New, Improved" Mayors Take Over City
Schools, PHI DELTA KAPPAN, Mar. 2000, at 538, 543. Indeed, voters tend to hold mayors
accountable for schools regardless whether mayors are in fact in control. See Fontenay,
supra note 138; see also Kenneth R. Wong & Francis X. Shen, Measuring the Effectiveness
of City and State Takeover as a School Reform Strategy, 78 PEABODY J. EDUC. 89, 114
(2003) (citing evidence that mayors who take over schools administer "additional tests" in
order "to [ejnhance [p]ublic [c]onfidence").
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York City's Michael Bloomberg, for example, has "insisted that his
mayoralty ... be judged by the state of the city's public schools. 261
Perhaps more important, mayors are politically accountable outside
the ballot box to a constituency different and broader than the
employment regime's. Kenneth Meier emphasizes that a citywide
electorate replaces the "ward-based constituencies of school board
members," with important distributional consequences.269 Moreover,
as scholars of urban politics have argued, urban mayoralties are also
supported by regimes, in the usual case ones dominated by urban
business and development interests.270 Mayoral control thus entails
the substitution of one regime for another.271 That business and real
estate interests might have privileged access to the mayor's ear
naturally makes professional educators suspect that mayoral control
invites into school governance crass politicization and shortsighted
policymaking;27 2 but compared to the complacency and insularity of
the employment regimes, the typical urban regime likely will seem
benign to outside observers. 73
At the same time, mayors are particularly suited to upend
employment regimes because of institutional advantages that both
share: mayors are politically powerful, administratively flexible, and
emphatically local-like school districts but unlike individual parents,
judges, state-level officialdom, or the NCLB bureaucracy in
Washington.274 Where state education departments lack the capacity
and credibility needed to manage troubled school systems directly,
268. Jennifer Steinhauer, Pupils Wait for the Bell; Mayor Waits for His Test, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 25, 2003, at B1.
269. Meier, supra note 266, at 224.
270. Indeed, the concept of "employment regimes" originates with scholarship on
urban regimes. See CLARENCE N. STONE, REGIME POLITICS: GOVERNING ATLANTA,
1946-1988, at 4 (1989); see also Orr, supra note 137, at 35-36 (describing the mayoral
regime and priorities of Baltimore's Mayor Schafer).
271. Henig and Rich, in general agreement with the conclusion that a shift from school
boards to mayors changes the power calculus of educational governance, nevertheless note
the possibility that employment interests could retool under a mayoral regime and so gain
leverage over mayors similar to the power they had over school boards. Jeffrey Henig &
Wilbur Rich, Concluding Observations: Governance Structure as a Tool, Not a Solution, in
MAYORS IN THE MIDDLE, supra note 136, at 249, 252-53.
272. See Richard C. Hunter, The Mayor Versus the School Superintendent: Political
Incursions into Metropolitan School Politics, 29 EDUC. & URB. SOC'Y 217, 223-25, 229-30
(1997) ("The mismatch of power between educators and politicians practically invites the
latter to scapegoat the educators.").
273. But cf Meier, supra note 266, at 227 (reasoning that merely enlarging
constituencies of elected officials, in hopes of staunching the power of parochial concerns,
"is no guarantee that the representative of that constituency is more competent-or less
corrupt-than the representatives of the smaller constituency").
274. See Marschall & Shah, supra note 7, at 165.
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sprawling street-level bureaucracies are mayors' lifeblood. External
regulatory power is irreducibly constrained by the local power over
policy implementation; mayoral power is not.
Finally, mayoral power can increase state power over schools
without requiring states to regulate them directly. Mayoral control
over schools, bestowed by the state, can be withdrawn by the state as
well; so when mayors and districts both seek power over schools, the
state's role shifts from that of a constrained regulator to that of
kingmaker, in the position, as the bestower of the desired prize, to
extract concessions from all sides. To be sure, mayors are not
powerless either. The state can enjoy a kingmaker role only if there
are at least two genuine contenders for authority, and thus actual or
feigned mayoral reluctance to accept responsibility for schools has
permitted mayors in many cases to extract concessions from the
state.275  But if the mayoral interest is in fact genuine-as it is
particularly likely to be whenever mayoral control has been once
bestowed-states gain leverage by being able to threaten whichever
institution is in power that the other might soon replace it.276 In this
275. Mayors at one time "preferred to avoid entanglement in schools." Michael N.
Danielson & Jennifer Hochschild, Changing Urban Education: Lessons, Cautions,
Prospects, in CHANGING URBAN EDUCATION, supra note 219, at 277, 284. Under current
circumstances neither this generalization nor its opposite seems reliable. Compare Lolis
Eric Elie, Oakland's Mayor Is Still in Orbit, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), June 14,
1999, at B1, available at 1999 WLNR 1224715 (reporting that Oakland Mayor Jerry
Brown, asked whether his efforts to gain the power to appoint some members to the
school board constituted a "naked power grab," responded: "Most people in politics
prefer more power to less power"), with Susan Snyder, Heydt Wants To Take Over
Allentown School District; School Officials, Mayors of Easton, Bethlehem Recoil at the
Prospect, ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL (Pa.), Nov. 8, 1996, at Al (quoting Bethlehem
(Pa.) Mayor Ken Smith analogizing running the schools to being handed "a bag of
snakes"), and Two Visions, supra note 138 (reporting Kansas City Mayor Kay Barnes'
statement: "We can't even keep Kemper Arena clean. I don't know why we have the
audacity to believe we can take on another full plate when we already have one.").
Mayors might desire control over the schools because voters expect it of them, see supra
note 267, because important business or other constituencies desire it, see, e.g., Shipps,
supra note 140, at 69-71; James Heaney, Mayors in Charge, BUFFALO NEWS, Jan. 24,
1999, at Al; Neal, supra note 138; Q&A: Improvement Board Would Have Muscle,
PATRIOT-NEWS (Harrisburg, Pa.), May 4, 2000, at A12, or because they simply think they
can help, see Rich & Chambers, supra note 137, at 172-73.
Mayors sometimes disavow interest in control over public schools as part of a
dynamic which leads to mayoral control and state concessions. See Mirel, supra note 137,
at 131-32 (discussing Detroit mayor); cf. Orr, supra note 137, at 47 (discussing Baltimore
mayor acquiescing in reductions in his power in return for extra resources for schools). It
is impossible to determine whether such initial disavowals and subsequent changes of
heart are sincere or strategic.
276. For example, in the 1990s a newly assertive state considerably reduced
longstanding mayoral authority over Baltimore schools. See Orr, supra note 137, at 27,
46-47.
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way, districts under mayoral control are made just as contingent as
traditionally managed school districts. In this new era of school
governance, no institution-neither mayoral regimes nor employment
regimes-has access to the kind of unquestioned power that was once
school districts' by birthright.
B. State Courts Sidelined
If, as I have argued, plaintiffs' third-wave victories catalyzed the
reallocation of power to the detriment of school districts, then one
consequence of the third wave has special irony. Plaintiffs advocated
third-wave theories as a way to overcome state courts' reluctance to
embrace equity theory and so maintain a strong judicial voice in
education reform. But the structural reforms that the third wave has
wrought do just the opposite. They decrease districts' willingness to
litigate school reform cases. In the medium term they will increase
the frequency of judicial abstention. Finally, they will vastly
complicate the already difficult questions of remedy that bedevil such
judicial interventions as do occur.
The first effect of structural change is to reverse districts'
incentives to support the litigation of school reform cases, by
undermining an alliance between reform-oriented plaintiffs and
distressed school districts that first arose after the second Milliken v.
Bradley case. 77 In Milliken II, the Supreme Court ratified as a
remedy for segregation the practice of funneling substantial external
funds to districts for the purpose of eliminating all traces of their
segregated education systems.27 Because these funds could be and
were used for a wide range of programs, both curricular and capital,
districts recognized that substantial advantages could flow from a
finding that they were segregated.27 9 Districts, though nominal
defendants in desegregation cases, quickly found that their interests
were better aligned with the plaintiffs who sought to expand their
resources.
280
277. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
278. See id. at 290.
279. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995), is the textbook case. The Kansas City,
Missouri School District ("KCMSD") entered that desegregation case as a plaintiff, with
the state of Missouri as a defendant. Id. at 74. Although the trial court "realigned the
KCMSD as a nominal defendant," id., it accepted the district's remedial
recommendations, id. at 75, and ordered "massive expenditures" that "allowed the District
planners to dream and provided the mechanism for th[ose] dreams to be realized," id. at
79-80.
280. See MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 416 (4th ed.
2002) (collecting cases).
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A similar dynamic is at work in education-finance cases. Those
cases aim explicitly to bring more dollars to distressed districts, funds
that districts want. Districts accordingly have been willing to accept
judicial findings not only that they educate students unequally, but
that they do so inadequately. The cash remedy is well worth the
scarlet label.2 81  Indeed, when additional aid is at stake, adequacy
litigation is a win-win situation for districts governed by employment
regimes. Either they will be declared to be adequate or, even better,
sent money. But when states begin to respond to findings that a
district is educating its students inadequately by stripping the district
of power, rather than by (or even in addition to) increasing state aid,
the calculus for districts shifts dramatically. The possibility of a loss
of district power is the worst possible outcome for employment
regimes; new resources are not valuable to the regime if the regime
cannot direct their use.28
Education-finance plaintiffs will in the future, therefore,
increasingly need to overcome opposition, not only from the state,
but from districts, who were once their allies and whom they are
ostensibly trying to help.
This opposition, moreover, is the least of plaintiffs' problems.
The erosion of district power will also likely strengthen a judicial
policy of abstention. As noted above, a major obstacle to the success
of second-wave cases was judges' concern that to adjudicate them
would require them to supervise a large chunk of states' tax collection
and resource allocation functions; several courts concluded that the
cases therefore should be treated as nonjusticiable "political
questions." '283 Third-wave theory was designed to blunt the political
question argument. 4  Because it imposes no distributional
requirements once the floor of adequacy is satisfied for all, it leaves
distributional politics above the floor to the politicians. Moreover,
281. Shame does appear to be a nontrivial motivator of district behavior, and
regulators have adopted strategies of regulation by information and of public excoriation
of deficient districts in order to harness shame to reformist ends. See, e.g., Peter Marks,
Legislators Pass Bill To Seize a School District in Nassau, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1995, at 1, 22
(reporting ex-member of Roosevelt (N.Y.) school board explaining his old colleagues'
resistance to reform as a "shame thing"); Michael J. Petrilli, School Reform Moves to the
Suburbs, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2005, at A17 (noting that NCLB's "primary mechanisms are
sunshine and shame: gathering statistics and alerting the community when a school is not
doing right"); cf Dyson, supra note 41, at 625-27 (noting the possibility of using "negative
gossip" and "poor media coverage" to encourage elected officials to cooperate with school
finance reform efforts).
282. See Saiger, supra note 10, at 1676.
283. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
284. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
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third-wave plaintiffs suggest that because adequacy is a less slippery
concept than equality, and especially because adequacy is itself
routinely defined by legislators, the standards that it does impose are
more judicially manageable than those put in place by the second
wave.
285
These advantages of adequacy are not just attenuated but
actually reversed if states respond to the doctrine by adjusting how
power is distributed across organs and levels of government. Any
court inclined to view the distribution of tax burdens and resources
among communities as a nonjusticiable political question is a fortiori
guaranteed so to view the distribution of power among governmental
institutions; and even courts not convinced of the former might well
endorse the latter. Indeed, it is extremely hard to imagine any court
that would be willing to intervene outright in a reallocation of powers
once districts' to other institutions, absent evidence that the shift was
meant to evade its orders. Although there is room to doubt whether
mayoral control will in fact bring about educational improvement,286
for example, that question has apparently played no role in arriving at
the judicial consensus, unanimous at this writing, that states have the
power to reconfigure independent school boards as dependent
agencies of city government so long as their action has a rational
basis.287 If courts accept states' plausible argument that management
rather than money is at the heart of distressed schools' woes, this sort
of rational basis deference to decisions about governmental structure
could easily blossom into the reemergence of political question
abstinence.
Mayoral control raises political question problems in another
way as well. One justification for nonabstention that has been
suggested by state courts is that state constitutions privilege education
above other government services. This is clearest in New Jersey,
whose high court has been piling remedial orders upon the state and
its school districts for decades28 8 without seeing substantial results.
That court has acknowledged that "perhaps nothing short of
substantial social and economic change affecting housing,
285. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
286. See Kenneth K. Wong & Francis X. Shen, When Mayors Lead Urban Schools:
Assessing the Effects of Mayoral Takeover, in BESIEGED, supra note 32, at 81, 83.
287. See Moore v. Detroit Sch. Reform Bd., 2002 FED App. 0205P, 10, 293 F.3d 352,
358-63 (6th Cir. 2002); Mixon v. Ohio, 1999 FED App. 0347P, 30-31, 193 F.3d 389, 408-09
(6th Cir. 1999); Harrisburg Sch. Dist. v. Zogby, 828 A.2d 1079, 1089-91 (Pa. 2003).
288. See generally Alexandra Greif, Politics, Practicalities, and Priorities: New Jersey's
Experience Implementing the Abbott V Mandate, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 615 (2004)
(cataloguing the evolving mandates in the Abbott cases).
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employment, child care, taxation, and welfare will make the
difference" for poor students.289  Nevertheless, the court argued,
because education alone among "essential governmental services" is
mentioned in its state constitution, education alone is within the
remedial power of its judiciary.29
This argument is presented to justify the court's continuing
insistence on growing education budgets notwithstanding highly
plausible arguments that funds would better be used elsewhere. But
the wellsprings of the argument lie in the political question problem.
Courts could, after all, have read constitutional education clauses to
permit them to regulate "housing, employment, child care, taxation,
[and] welfare" 91-a list of policy areas to which I would add land use
and environmental regulation-because such regulations directly
affect equality of educational opportunity. But this would have come
de facto to a near-complete takeover of municipal policymaking.
Courts manage to avoid such a course, which presents the political
question problem four-square, in large part because the unique status
their doctrine gives to schools has been accompanied by a policy on
the ground of organizing special governments-school districts-
whose exclusive business is schooling. Because different government
institutions handle education and other public functions, judicial
remedies regarding education can be directed towards school districts
and so confined to schooling. Ramifications for the rest of general-
government policy and polity are real but second-order.
This strategy loses bite when on-the-ground exceptionalism is
attenuated or abandoned. Professors Henig and Rich argue that
mayoral control puts
decisions about schools in the hands of a leader in a position to
steer decisions about child welfare, safety, public health,
recreation, job training, and economic development-issue
areas that bear heavily on the tasks that schools are expected to
perform but which typically are outside the sphere of influence
of superintendents and school boards.2"
The turn to mayors thus reinforces the connection, which courts have
sought to sever, between education and the rest of the municipal
budget. If a judicial demand that education budgets be increased
directly requires concomitant reductions in the sanitation,
289. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott II), 575 A.2d 359, 403 (N.J. 1990).
290. Id. at 375, 403; accord Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 392 (Vt. 1997).
291. Abbott 11, 575 A.2d at 403.
292. Henig & Rich, supra note 141, at 7.
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transportation, welfare, and library services available to poor
children, as Henig and Rich appear to suggest, courts making such
demands seem again to be displacing the core political function that is
supposed to belong to municipal government.
Although I think that structural change increases the probability
that judges will increasingly frequently retreat from the adjudication
of education rights under the political question doctrine, some courts
will persevere. They will continue to adopt reasoning like that of the
New Jersey Supreme Court, which has reiterated in several of its
many Abbott v. Burke cases that, even in the face of substantial doubt
that additional funding for distressed districts will bring about
adequate education for children in those districts-indeed even in the
face of doubt that any educational practice can erase their
disadvantages-there is nevertheless a constitutional, justiciable state
obligation to provide those funds.2 93  New funds are required
notwithstanding that they "may fail to achieve the constitutional
object, [in] that no amount of money may be able to ... make the
difference for these students [in poor districts]. ' '294 On an Abbott-like
view of the law, a court could accept nonjusticiable state authority
over noneducation policy and over the arrangement of educational
governance while continuing to insist that other educational areas,
such as finance and the nature of schools' remedial and support
programs,29 remain subject to court jurisdiction.
The problem with which governance change confronts courts like
New Jersey's is not justiciability but remediability-already the
Achilles' heel of the school-finance movement. If power over
distressed schools is widely distributed, at whom should the court
direct its remedial instructions? Not all state arrogations of power
raise this quandary. For example, that the New Jersey governor and
legislature disestablished several Abbott districts and imposed direct
state control upon their affairs did not affect those districts' corporate
identity; the courts could and did order the state to supplement the
budgets of state-run districts just as it was required to do for locally-
293. Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 403 ("[Elven if not a cure, money will help .... If the claim
is that additional funding will not enable the poorer urban districts to satisfy the thorough
and efficient test, the constitutional answer is that they are entitled to pass or fail with at
least the same amount of money as their competitors.").
294. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott IV), 693 A.2d 417, 439 (N.J. 1997).
295. Remedial and support programs became part of the Abbott remedy with Abbott v.
Burke (Abbott V), 710 A.2d 450, 473 (N.J. 1998) (ordering the state to ensure that
distressed districts provide, inter alia, services such as full-day kindergarten and college
transition programs).
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run ones.296 However, had the state arrogated particular powers of
those districts to itself in the name of reform-to take a hypothetical
example, the power to develop detailed curricula and select
instructional materials-the problem would have been much
different. Would the Abbott court have been prepared to order the
state department of education to reallocate its budget internally so as
to increase support for that function as applied to the Abbott
districts? Obversely, would the court have been prepared to order
the state to decrease support of that same function if the court felt
that the department's activities were not supportive of reform?
Either way, it is hard to see any basis upon which the ordering court
could reasonably expect its actions to have the desired remedial
results.
A sound remedial approach is even more elusive if one imagines
a state reacting to local distress by facilitating the establishment of
scores of charter schools in a distressed district, what Professor Bruce
Fuller calls "decentering the state."2 97 Would a court be prepared to
order substantial extra funding across the board when much of it
would flow to charter entrepreneurs whose raison d'etre is freedom
from government regulation; or would the courts then be tempted to
begin regulating charters' practices as they have regulated those of
district schools? Obversely, would the court be prepared to restrict
extra funds to traditional district-run schools, and in so doing gut the
foundational market mechanism by which charter schools are made
viable and district schools forced to compete? Would it matter that
parents "choose" their children's charters, notwithstanding the often
weak academic performance of such schools, so that judicial
regulation would work to obviate parental choice? Is there a
conceptually satisfying distinction between charter parents' choice
and the way that other parents "choose" to remain in district
schools?2 98 Would the relevance of choice in fact depend on whether
charter schools' academic performance was worse than district
296. Cf Nat'l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, supra note 182, at tbls.90-91 (listing data for
expenditure increases in Newark N.J., which has been state-run since 1995).
297. See Fuller, supra note 122, at 1.
298. The question whether these two types of "choice" were different, and whether
that difference mattered to the question before it, tied the Supreme Court in knots in the
Cleveland vouchers case, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2001). Compare the
treatment of charters, called "community schools" in Cleveland, id. at 647, 654, 655, 659,
and id. at 673-76 (O'Connor, J., concurring), and id. at 681 (Thomas, J., concurring), with
id. at 685 (Stevens, J., dissenting), and id. at 700-01 & nn.9-10 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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schools' instead of better?299 Again no logical or even reasonable way
to direct remedial funds under such circumstances presents itself.
A less hypothetical example of this problem arises if one again
considers a state that responds to inadequacy by establishing mayoral
control. This has not happened in any of the Abbott districts, or
anywhere else in New Jersey; but it has occurred in neighboring New
York City, °" another school district whose education program has
been deemed inadequate by the state's highest court and where a
financial remedy has been decreed.3"' It is instructive to compare the
New Jersey and New York cases on the critical question of what level
of government is responsible for raising the new resources the court
requires. This was an easy question for the New Jersey Supreme
Court: funding for distressed schools must come from state rather
than local treasuries, because poor cities are "already over-taxed to
exhaustion.""3 2 Contrast the hands-off view of the New York Court
of Appeals that "how the [funding] burden is distributed between the
State and [New York] City [is a] matter for the Legislature desiring to
enact good laws" rather than the courts3°3-this notwithstanding the
Abbott-like argument of the city of New York that
the State's obligation to provide the sound basic education
funds cannot be sloughed off to the City. The State is the cause
of the Constitutional problem, and must be the source of the
required funds, both in light of the unique circumstances
surrounding the City's financial affairs-e.g., the City's fiscal
dependency and the fact that the City already pays more than
its fair share of its incredibly high public assistance costs-and
also as a matter of law, equity, and elemental fairness. 3"
299. In Cleveland, charter schools operating when the Zelman record was made were
reporting test scores lower than those of district schools. See id. at 702 n.10 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). The import of this fact and its relationship to the nature of choice also
frustrated the Zelman court. Compare id. at 670-71, 673-75 (O'Connor, J., concurring),
with id. at 702 n.10 (Souter, J., dissenting).
300. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 346 (N.Y. 2003)
(placing adoption of mayoral control in New York in the context of other "federal and
state measures directed at identifying and improving bad schools").
301. Id. at 343.
302. Abbott H, 575 A.2d 359, 394 (N.J. 1990).
303. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 801 N.E.2d at 348.
304. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Memorandum of Law of the City of
New York at 3, Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, No. 111070/93 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Oct. 29, 2004), available at http://www.cfequity.org/compliance/citybrief102904.pdf
[hereinafter CFE Brief of NYC]; see also id. para. 45-53, at 10 (quoting, inter alia, Mayor
Bloomberg's averral that "[iut would be 'very difficult, if not impossible' to raise taxes in
New York City"); id. at 36, 39 (it is "nearly impossible for [the City] to raise the additional
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The trial court also ducked this key, contested question on remand, °5
thus postponing its consideration until after the appeal now pending
to await some future, undoubtedly prolonged, round of litigation.
One explanation for this contrast is that New York is a wealthy
city, where the cities coterminous with the Abbott districts-Newark,
Camden, Trenton, Jersey City-are desperately poor. But mayoral
control is another explanation. There is of course no jurisprudential
barrier to demanding that a city, just as a state, spend massively on
education to meet a constitutional requirement, whatever the impact
on its nonconstitutional obligations. But it is much more palatable to
demand that a state divert funds spent educating the privileged to
schools for the poor than to require a city generously to fund its
schools at the expense of libraries, policing, parks, and sanitation.3"6
The mayor of New York runs a city, not just a school system; he is
accountable to voters for his spending trade-offs; and he navigates an
intricate political web of intergovernmental aid of which education
funding is but one strand.30 7 As noted above, courts are (properly) far
more reluctant to enter such a minefield than to demand new state
aid for thirty-odd small and impoverished New Jersey districts.
But more than that, courts are (again properly) unsure if such a
remedy will actually remediate. Even if a city budget is not a zero-
sum game-a claim that the city of New York has emphatically
rejected throughout the Campaign for Fiscal Equity litigation3° 8-
does it benefit poor children fully to fund their schools if some or
funding necessary for its schools."); Bonnie A. Scherer, Comment, Footing the Bill for a
Sound Basic Education in New York City, 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 901, 923-25 (2005)
(cataloging arguments against funding school spending increases with City-raised funds).
305. The New York Court of Appeals remanded Campaign for Fiscal Equity to the
trial court for the design of a remedial order; the trial judge in turn delegated the job to a
panel of special masters. The panel recommended an expansive remedial plan that would
increase the total funding of city schools half again from their current levels; but it
followed the Court of Appeals and declined to offer an opinion regarding whether city or
state should pay, so long as "the State Legislature .. . [is not] arbitrary or unreasonable in
its allocation to the City of New York of a funding burden." Report and
Recommendations of the Judicial Referees para. 85-87, Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc.
v. State, No. 111070/93 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 30, 2004), available at http://www.cfequity.org/
compliance/RefereeFinalReportll.30.04.pdf. The trial judge then elided much of this
complexity, choosing to read the language of the Court of Appeals quoted above as
"categorically provid[ing] that it is for the Legislature to determine how school funding
should be distributed between State and City." See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v.
State, No. 111070/93, at 8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 14, 2005) (order confirming report and
recommendations of the judicial referees), available at http://www.cfequity.org/degrasse
021405.pdf.
306. See supra notes 288-90 and accompanying text.
307. See CFE Brief of NYC, supra note 304, para. 35-40, at 8-9.
308. See id. para. 45-61, at 9-11.
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most of those monies will come from their parks, their libraries, their
police protection, and their public health, welfare, and employment
services? That "no" is the most probable answer to this question
must give a responsible court pause ....
Therefore, once courts accept the nonjusticiability of government
structure-a position that seems unavoidable-they will find
themselves either unwilling to continue to oversee education policy,
or unable to do so even if they have a mind to try. By substituting the
chaos of polyarchy for the orderliness of layer-cake educational
governance, states have effectively made the control of education
policy too inchoate an undertaking to get judicial hands around.
C. Suburban Dominance at Risk?
Potentially, the most momentous consequence of the redefinition
of the school district's role may be to initiate the erosion of the ability
of suburban communities to quarantine themselves from the
problems of others while investing in their own systems of public
education." 9  In many ways, this would be (again) an ironic
development: it was suburban opposition to second-wave equity
claims, and then to third-wave remedies inimical to their interests,
that encouraged states to undertake school governance reform. But
in another respect the consequence seems utterly straightforward.
The school district is the institution through which suburbanites have
been able to build and preserve islands of privileged educational
localism. Inroads into district power challenge localism everywhere.
It is easy to see how governance reform seemed safe to
suburbanites; indeed today suburban school districts remain, for the
most part, quite secure in their power. This is because the revolution
in school governance has less frequently withdrawn powers from
school districts absolutely, preferring to make existing powers
contingent. A district need not change anything about what it does so
long as it can continue to satisfy New Accountability targets, NCLB
mandates, and parents shopping among district and charter schools.
Governance reform thus has initially targeted districts that cannot, or
otherwise prefer not to, meet these externally-imposed goals.310 The
result has been to introduce a great deal of variance into governance
arrangements: Even as distressed districts lose local autonomy in
ways both dramatic and subtle, prosperous, successful suburban
309. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
310. On the distinction between school districts' reform capacity and reform
preferences, see Saiger, supra note 10, at 1677-84.
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districts carry on mostly as before.' 1  Indeed, the popularity of
governance reform among policymakers has arguably depended on its
variability,3"2 since elected officials both state and national depend on
suburban constituencies who prefer their school districts as they are.
Nevertheless, to exercise contingent powers successfully is a
different matter, even for districts powerful and prosperous, than to
exercise power as of right. Early rumblings that the new modes of
educational governance might come to endanger the successful
districts of the suburbs, as well as the distressed districts urban and
rural, are beginning to be heard. Most of these rumblings emanate
from two areas: the implementation of the No Child Left Behind Act
and school choice.
With the No Child Left Behind Act, the tentacles of federal
regulation have started to sting not just distressed, underperforming
districts but school districts that have long viewed themselves as
highly successful.3 13 The detailed demands of NCLB regarding the
frequency of standardized testing,314  the populations and
subpopulations to be tested, and what counts as annual progress in
test scores315 result in generally high-achieving schools sometimes
being labeled as needing improvement-as "failing," in the popular
argot316-notwithstanding generally high scores, if, for example, they
use unacceptable testing rubrics or schedules, exempt sizable
populations of non-native English speakers or disabled students from
testing, or cannot demonstrate achievement for every federally-
defined subgroup of the student population. 317  The "failing" label
infuriates suburban schools that view themselves as anything but-a
view perhaps complacent in part, but, in light of overall levels of
achievement, defensible.318 For the many suburban schools that
311. See id. at 1730-31 (discussing this phenomenon in context of New Accountability).
312. See id. at 1694-95.
313. See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
314. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2) (Supp. 112002).
315. See id. § 6311(b)(3)(C)(xiii).
316. See Ryan, supra note 93, at 945.
317. See Linda Darling-Hammond, From "Separate but Equal" to "No Child Left
Behind": The Collision of New Standards and Old Inequalities, in MANY CHILDREN LEFT
BEHIND, supra note 104, at 3, 15-16; Ryan, supra note 93, at 944 ("[A] large number of
schools in every state are likely to be deemed 'failing' because of the [NCLB] Act.");
Petrilli, supra note 281.
318. See Petrilli, supra note 281 ("[I]n the suburbs, bad news [generated by NCLB]
about local schools captures the quick attention of politicians (and residents worried about
their property values)."); see also Ryan, supra note 93, at 942 (emphasizing that NCLB
disseminates information on the performance of all schools, including those not receiving
Title I funds). For a discussion of state efforts to block provisions of NCLB unfriendly to
the suburbs, see supra note 107.
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receive federal Title I funds,319 the label also subjects them to the
NCLB's sanctions regime. 2 °
Such federal incursions into suburban district autonomy are
particularly striking when they are based upon the underperformance
of racial, language, or special-needs minorities whose problems were
previously masked by strong test performance by a larger student
majority. To many, it is a cardinal virtue of the NCLB that it
demands high performance, not only overall, but for individual
subgroups that otherwise are "basically invisible. '321 One can demur
to this policy judgment and still recognize that, in imposing stigma
and, perhaps worse, sanctions on suburban districts as a result of
minority underachievement, NCLB represents a signal of political
failure for the cause of suburban educational autonomy. Especially
given the Act's origins in and hard-line enforcement by a Republican
administration whose base does not lie in minority communities,3 22
the Act demonstrates how governance reform, once unleashed, can
turn on suburban districts who initially imagined themselves beyond
its purview.323 Suburban interests remain very powerful in both state
and national politics. Nevertheless, suburban districts, organized to
provide education with only minimal regard for the problems of poor
communities, are now being ordered by state and national
administrations--elected with suburban support-to pay heed, and
allocate resources, to the poor and to other minorities within their
borders. To be sure, the NCLB and its advocates nowhere suggest
that this obligation might cross district lines, or that it be applied to a
state allocating resources among districts as well as to districts
allocating resources across and within schools. But the first sort of
319. See Ryan, supra note 93, at 942.
320. See Saiger, supra note 10, at 1720-21, 1725.
321. See Petrilli, supra note 281. But see James S. Kim & Gail L. Sunderman,
Measuring Academic Proficiency Under the No Child Left Behind Act, 34 EDUC.
RESEARCHER 3, 12 (Nov. 2005) ("[T]he NCLB subgroup policy puts racially diverse
schools at greater risk of failing.").
322. For a discussion of the Act's base in Republican support, and for the strange-
bedfellows bipartisan coalition that permitted its passage, see KOSAR, supra note 48, at
186.
323. The political point is not obviated by recent moves by the Federal Department of
Education to conciliate its previously hardline approach and grant suburbs some
additional flexibility. See Lynn Olson, Florida Gains Flexibility on NCLB Provisions:
Fewer Schools Likely to Miss Annual Progress Goals Under Changes, EDUC. WK., May 25,
2005, at 18; Lynn Olson, Requests Win More Leeway Under NCLB: Ed. Dept. Gives 16
States Approval on Changes, EDUC. WK., July 13, 2005, at 1; Christina A. Samuels, Special
Education Test Flexibility Detailed, EDUC. WK., May 18, 2005, at 22. But see Liebman &
Sabel, supra note 199, at 1725 & n.85 (suggesting, contrary to generally accepted opinion,
that NCLB regulation has consistently been flexible).
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interference is politically unpalatable enough; and in its light these
more alarming possibilities suddenly appear less fantastic.
A similar dynamic is associated with school choice. Suburbanites
had acquiesced in the use of choice as shock therapy and/or an
accountability sanction for poor schools, but choice was for other
people. The schools of the suburbs were not to be made available as
schools of choice for nonresident students,'24 nor were in-district
students to be offered vouchers that would permit exit from suburban
district schools.325 Suburbanites, the primary beneficiaries of the
status quo, have economic, political, and educational incentives to
preserve both the localism and the publicness of their local, public
schools.326 Indeed, many commentators have advocated properly
designed choice programs as a means of eroding suburban advantage,
because choice can attenuate the relationship between place and
education.327 Suburbanites are wary of choice for just this reason.
Nevertheless choice, in the form of charter schools, has arrived in
the suburbs. Although the suburban aversion to choice classically
extends to charters,328 such schools have proliferated sufficiently to
kick up dust in districts far from America's urban core.3 9 In several
once-complacent districts, prosperous parents, dissatisfied with what
they regard as curricular vagueness and faddism in district schools, 3 °
have launched charters; such efforts can, as in the widely noted case
of Princeton, New Jersey, elicit fierce opposition from the district
side. 1 Such opposition is clearly due not merely to the transfer of
324. See supra note 110; Ryan, supra note 41, at 1646.
325. See Ryan & Heise, supra note 114, at 2045, 2080-81.
326. See id.
327. E.g., GOODWIN & KEMERER, supra note 113, at 5 (advocating the "use of choice
to promote equity"); RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER Now: CREATING
MIDDLE-CLASS SCHOOLS THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 116-35 (2001) (advocating
program of controlled choice); MCDERMOTT, supra note 183, at 121, 131-34 (proposing
that states abolish school districts, and replace them with a regime involving centralized
finance, school-level discretion, and school choice); Forman, supra note 210, at 1311
(noting proposals for voucher implementation designed to achieve "race and class
integration"); Liu & Taylor, supra note 115, at 809-11 (promoting the exercise of choice as
an approach with potential "desegregative impact"); Ryan, supra note 8, at 310-15
(arguing that choice can be responsive to structural inequities in education).
328. See Ryan & Heise, supra note 114, at 2077.
329. See supra text accompanying note 133.
330. See HOCHSCHILD & SCOVRONICK, supra note 13, at 117; Kate Zernike, Selling
Air: New England Parents Spark a New Revolution, in INSIDE CHARTER SCHOOLS, supra
note 122, at 126 ("[d]issident suburban parents" organize charter to avoid the
overemphasis on rote learning they perceive in local district schools); CHIARA R. NAPPI,
THOMAS B. FORDHAM FOUND., WHY CHARTER SCHOOLS?: THE PRINCETON STORY 3-
4 (1999), available at http://www.edexcellence.net/doc/wcs.pdf.
331. See NAPPI, supra note 330, at 12-16.
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students from district to charter but to the concomitant loss of power.
No longer can districts like Princeton's be uniformly responsive to
their familiar, internal constituencies; instead they must attend to the
market, and in particular to the preferences of parent-consumers with
the power to choose between charter and district schools. Thus,
choice-induced changes in governance bring new constraints to
suburban schools.
For now, the incursions of choice into suburban district
autonomy are limited to charters; but the reality of these early
incursions cannot but make suburbanites wonder whether other, less
palatable intrusions might be in the offing.332 What is to prevent, for
example, state or federal regulators from pegging a district's
accountability status to academic performance outside district lines,
perhaps to a metropolitan average? Regionalization or redistricting
have not had much success as judicial remedies, but a bureaucracy
might easily adopt a backdoor to regionalization by incorporating
regional performance indicators into individual districts'
accountability scores. Perhaps one day a sufficiently visionary and
energetic urban mayor might even convince a state legislature, as the
price for his acquiescence in mayoral control, to use the district
consolidation sanction and hand over to her not just city schools but
some neighboring suburban ones as well.333 Or a state might pick up
the NCLB's lead and threaten to disestablish rich districts that fail to
meet bureaucratic requirements for minority achievement or racial
integration.
I do not mean to suggest that these possibilities are not
somewhat farfetched, much less that they are actually waiting in the
wings. At the present time, none is politically viable. But they are
not bad ideas; and in the new, polyarchic ecology of education, they
seem less fanciful than they would have in the era when districts
ruled. After all, it is no longer farfetched to imagine that regulators
in far-off Washington threaten suburban districts across the country
that unless their migrant students, their English language learners,
and their African-American pupils show annual academic progress,
district leaders will feel genuine pain.
CONCLUSION
That the third wave of school-finance reform is in all likelihood
the last does not imply any erosion in the centrality of education
332. I am indebted for this point to Michael Danielson.
333. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
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rights. It means only that the task of identifying and pressing for the
adoption of an effective, judicially cognizable statement of the precise
contours of those rights is an undertaking whose usefulness-whose
feasibility-may be at an end. Educational power is ever more widely
distributed over a bewildering array of governmental and
nongovernmental actors: state and federal regulators, governors and
legislatures, parent-consumers, and urban mayors have joined the
weakened traditional players-courts, school boards, and their
supporting regimes. Advocates seeking to advance education rights
must therefore turn their attention to ways to influence all of these
institutions as they continuously jockey for power in the newly
polyarchic educational ecology. This certainly will be no easy task.
The era of waves has ended, but no one should expect smooth sailing
ahead.
